



The Effect of Military Strategy on Mass Surrenderings of Boko Haram Terrorists in North East

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Abstract

The mass surrendering of the Boko haram Terrorists in the North East is the product of a functional military strategy which involves both kinetic and non-kinetic strategies. This paper thus, explores the efficacy of these combine military strategies in leading to the mass surrendering of the Boko Haramists. The paper adopted the qualitative method of gauging information which largely has to do with the usage of such secondary sources as academic journal and magazines, text books, archival materials, internet sourced materials. The paper found that the mass surrendering of the Boko Haramists is the direct product of the efficacy of the strategies adopted, and which are the outcome of the kinetic and non-kinetic military approaches adopted in the war against terror. The paper also found that the hybrid of Kinetic and no kinetic are reasons for the recent surge in the mass surrendering and they include a robust and round the year joint military offensives across the Theatre of Operations, the political will, infighting between the two rival terrorists group, the demised of Abubakar Shekau, the decapitation of some military commanders, the condonation of ex combatants by the community among others. The paper suggested, among other things that, there is the need for the security forces and the state government to ensure proper bio data capturing procedures are carried out on all combatants with regular monitoring of the combatants.

Keywords: Mass surrendering, Strategy, kinetic and non-kinetic.

I. Introduction

The issue of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been a major security concern for the Nigerian government, neighboring countries and the international community. The group has been responsible for numerous attacks, kidnappings, and killings in Nigeria and the neighboring countries especially the Lake Chad region. In response to the

insurgency, the Nigerian military employed various strategies particularly kinetic and non-kinetic which lead to the mass surrendering of the terrorists. This work will discuss the effectiveness of military strategies leading to mass Surrendering of Boko Haram and provide recent in-text citations and references to support the argument. Mass Surrendering involves encouraging members of an insurgency group to lay down their arms and surrender to the authorities. The Nigerian military, through its Operation Safe Corridor initiative, has been encouraging Boko Haram fighters to surrender in exchange for rehabilitation and reintegration into the society. According to Nigerian military, over 98,000 repentant Boko Haram fighters have surrendered since the initiative began in 2016 in Gombe State. Also, the Borno Model and camps of surrendered terrorists in Borno State has registered over 103,365 repentant terrorists. The effectiveness of this strategy has been a subject of debate, with some arguing that it is a viable option for ending the insurgency, while others criticize it as ineffective. On the one hand, the mass Surrenderings strategy has led to a decrease in the number of Boko Haram fighters in the Northeast region of Nigeria. According to the International Crisis Group (2021), the strategy has helped to weaken the group by reducing their capacity to carry out attacks and recruit new members. ICG (2021) also noted that some former Boko Haram members have been successfully reintegrated into society and are now playing a role in countering the prevalence and spread of the group's ideology.

Moreover, there are concerns that the strategy may not be sustainable in the long term. Some analysts argue that Boko Haram fighters who surrendered may not be genuine in their desire to lay down their arms and may still pose a threat to security in the future. Additionally, there are concerns about the lack of transparency and accountability in the rehabilitation and



reintegration process. The Human Rights Watch (2021) noted that there were reports of abuses, including torture and forced labor, in the rehabilitation centers. While the mass Surrenderings strategy may have contributed to the reduction in the number of Boko Haram fighters in Nigeria, it is not without its challenges. The success of the strategy depends on various factors, including the genuineness of the Surrenderings fighters and the effectiveness of the rehabilitation and reintegration process. Addressing these challenges will require a concerted effort by the Nigerian government, civil society, and the international community to ensure that the strategy is implemented effectively and transparently (Human Rights Watch, 2021).

The May 2015 election that brought on board Muhammadu Buhari as president of Nigeria changed the political context and, by extension, the degree of military cooperation between the two countries; according to Chadian diplomats, the two presidents get on much better and it has become much easier to share intelligence. Boko Haram has lost ground and the security situation today is much better than in 2015 on the Chadian islands and lakeshore. But the jihadist insurgency's resilience is well proven. The threat that it poses to local people will not diminish until the structural problems in Nigeria's Borno State are tackled. In light of this reality, a strategic change is required. The military interventions by countries in the Lake region – certainly necessary to curb Boko Haram's progression and the restrictions imposed on mobility and trade have an obvious impact on the everyday life of local people. This situation is not sustainable over the long term (Bamidele, 2015; Efebeh, 2016; Efebeh, 2020a; Adesote, Akande and Abimbola (2022) argue that the Government and Security Agents should understand that Preventive Security Management is now in vogue worldwide and as such efficient and effective Security Management is no longer measured with the quantum of Armed Personal Carriers, APC, Hilux pick up vans with siren, assault rifle, canisters, and so on that are deployed in major streets. For example, the former Inspector General of Police (Hafiz Ringim) after receiving costly security equipment from the Borno State Government declared that the days of Boko Haram were numbered, and in fact within few days they struck to totally demystify him and his men by taking the war to his office, thereby justifying the above assertion. This is to say that Governments and the Security Agencies should deploy more financial and human capital resources to the management of

security intelligence and surveillance. After all, these criminal elements are living among us. In other words, no matter their operational modalities, some members of their community know who they are, what they are doing and how they operate; which simply means that with proper security public enlightenment programmes and projects, they can be easily fished out and dealt with according to law before they can cause security breaches (Akinbi, 2015; Efebeh, 2020b).

An important institution that has crucial role to play in resolving conflicts that usually result to militancy attacks is the National Orientation Agency (NOA). Based on the demands of the Islamic sect, of which some of them may not be feasible, we think that, the first, assistance they need is re-orientation. Perhaps based on the earlier indoctrination they had received; they need to be engaged by NOA and be re-oriented and re-integrated into the Nigerian Agenda which is based on Unity in Diversity. They should be made to understand that they do not have any other country than Nigeria and as such, they stand to gain more in a united, virile, and strong Nigeria than disintegration. They can simply be reached and engaged via their community and enlightened religious leaders since they appear to have lost confidence and trust in their political leaders, who in their opinion have desecrated Islam (Usman & Bashir, 2018; Efebeh, 2016).

Another important strategy of combating domestic terrorism in the country is for the government to reevaluate her domestic policies. First, for the purpose of promoting national security in the country, the adoption of holistic approach which includes both preventive measures and long-term measures towards addressing conditions conducive for the spread of domestic terrorism be pursued vigorously. In fact, it is expected that these two elements should form a key compromise among the parliamentarians in the National Assembly by adopting the strategy through consensus. It could reiterate that conditions conducive for the spread of domestic terrorism include: poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion, socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance (Human Rights Watch, 2021). Therefore, effective implementation of this strategy would result in commitment to the realization of the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) and the determination to pursue and reinforce development and social inclusion agenda at every level, especially on youth unemployment,



and as well could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists, (Efebeh, 2018; Agbiboa, 2023).

On a final note, government can equally curtail the menace of the militants generally by engaging non-serving security experts, especially, retired military, police and paramilitary officers who live in all the communities of the country, mostly in the areas of security intelligence and surveillance. These ex-officers who have various security expertise and experience arising from their previous trainings and exposures while in service are in better positions to educate and re-orientate members of their communities on the negative impact of militancy on our collective existence and national development (Adesote et al., 2022).

An Overview of Military Strategies and Mass Surrendering of Boko Haram Terrorists in the North East

Historically, the stick and carrot approach characterizes the Nigerian government's responses to insecurity and dissent. Conflict such as the Civil War, the Maitatsine movement of the 1980s and the Niger Delta militants highlight situations where repression was seen as the optimal response to dissent. Before the demise of Mohammed Yusuf, the leader of Boko Haram, the security forces (including the police) response to the initial conflict was criticized. The criticism spanned from the conflicts poor handling to the arbitrary use of force (Varin, 2016). The subsequent crackdown in 2009, which eventually led to Muhammad Yusuf's demise, exacerbated the situation and changed the conflicts dynamism. Yusuf was used as a mobilizing force and martyr to highlight long-standing brutality from the security forces (Ike, Antonopoulos & Singh, 2022).

While concerted efforts have been made at deploying the security forces, successive government (administrations) have also engaged in dialogue and negotiation, which seems to have limited success. For instance, the administration of President Jonathan engaged in negotiations to curtail the conflict. In 2012, the Jonathan government attempted to broker a deal with Boko Haram through Datti Ahmad, the then President of the National Supreme Council on Sharia, to no avail. Similarly, on 2 May 2014, President Goodluck Jonathan announced that his administration made concerted efforts to rescue the kidnapped Chibok girls (Osasumwen, Adekunle, Roland & Segun, 2017). However, the assurance uttered by Jonathan was countered by a video

released on 12 May 2014 by Boko Haram in which Abubakar Shekau was shown in the midst of over 130 of the girls, demanding a prisoner exchange (Osasumwen et al., 2017). In 2017, President Muhammed Buhari administration set to expand one billion dollars from the Excess crude oil on the fight against Boko Haram in the Northeast, Nigeria. Indeed the consequence of terrorism in the Nigerian state has been so devastating, is an act that needed more urgent attention and solution, before it gets to its apogee. However, Muhammed Buhari administration efforts at negotiation have seen the release of the Kidnap Dapchi girls and even a series of kidnappings in early 2021, including the hundreds of girls abducted from Government Girls Secondary School, a boarding school in Jangebe in Zamfara State in March 2021 (Alfa & Ives, 2021). There is no doubt that recent years have also seen the country's increased security budget, which seems not to reflect the military's ability to counterterrorism effectively. The military counterinsurgency in Nigeria has been subjected to various criticisms. Onuoha, Nwangwu and Ugwueze (2020) argue that the criticism spans three main perspectives: the political, the strategic and the tactical.

At the political level, Onuoha et al. (2020) contend that lawmakers extort money from commanders and top security chiefs under the auspices or pretext of approving their budgetary allocations. At the strategic level encompassing military leadership and oversight, the procurement of relevant weapons and ammunition has been criticized because it is shrouded in secrecy. Onuoha et al. (2020) further argue that the military-led counterinsurgency is undermined by political leaders' failure, compromised legislative oversight, obsolete equipment and inadequate arms, the poor welfare system and sabotage and misuse of budgetary allocation. Perceptions on the use of military interventions were particularly negative and span from the community's perceived abuses meted by the security forces to informing resentment leading to radicalization into Boko Haram and ultimately lack of confidence in the security forces' ability to defeat Boko Haram. Members of the community perceive abuse by the security forces as a further basis for alienating the public from the security forces (Agbiboa, 2018).

The heavy-handed approach of the security forces highlights a sense of division in the populace who seems alienated and unwilling to cooperate. The perceived lack of confidence in the security forces as an intervention has consequences such as the reluctance on the part of the public to



divulge critical information to the security forces that may help counterterrorism and insecurity in Nigeria. In its extreme form, the public seems more likely to support vigilantes whom they believe are better alternatives to the security forces (including the Nigerian police and army).

(Agbibo, 2018). A possible explanation of why vigilantes are considered in a positive light might be because of the vigilantes' shared identity with the local community. The perceived 'empathy' and 'being part and parcel' of the community represent features perceived to be lacking in Nigerian security agencies. Botha and Abdile (2019) argue that the military can kill indiscriminately; it makes people angry, and they join to get back and government. The implications of these perceptions are that states could invariably unintentionally play a part in fuelling the drivers of terrorism or radicalization into terrorism. The perceived disconnect in the relationship between the security forces and the populace fuels resentment towards the former. The implication of which the quest for 'revenge' drives some aggrieved community members into Boko Haram. The police round up as many people they can at the site of an attack, often long after gunmen or bombers have fled. Instead of questioning these people, they are intimidated and money is extorted from them. Any information about Boko Haram hideouts they do receive is acted on in a very heavy-handed way. The police and army descend on the supposed hideout, all guns blazing, with innocent passers-by often caught and killed in the line of fire (Zulum, 2021; Efebeh & Okereka, 2020).

While negotiation seems to achieve a quick fix to issues such as kidnapping, Omeni (2017) argues that states should not concede to negotiating with the terrorists as it rewards terrorism as a tactic. However, this argument has been criticized both from tactical and strategic perspectives. At the tactical level, the plight of hostages and the government's duty to protect them is the ultimate goal (Richards, 2015). In contrast, at the strategic level, non-concession could lead to further terrorist activities, which might affect the State's reputation, tourism and economy (Richards, 2015; Efebeh, Ikenga and Orhero, 2021). Despite these criticisms, the adverse impact of negotiation in Nigeria highlights Ike, Singh and Murphy (2022) concerns, as seen in the widespread use of kidnapping as a Boko Haram tactic. Based on the preceding literature, there remains a gap in the literature that aims to synthesize community perspectives of interventions aimed at countering Boko Haram.

The Initial strategies Employed by the Government to Curb Terrorism in North East

Since the inception of terrorism and insurgency in Nigeria, government has developed various strategies towards curbing and mitigating the activities of Boko Haram. First is the use of brute military force against insurgent groups and deployment of over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria. In the recent time, the federal government deployed a specially trained anti-terrorism combat squad to the terrorist zones in order to suppress the activities of Boko Haram (Okupe, 2015; Efebeh, 2021; Efebeh & Uwuseba, 2023). However, current statistics shows that troops deployed in the north east are over 38,000. Second, is the acquisition and development of more sophisticated, adequate and appropriate military hardware and the recent approval by the African Union and the violations of a broad-based international coalition to collaborate with the military. Third, is the approval given by the international bodies with the consent of the Nigerian Government for the neighbouring countries (Chad, Niger and Cameroon) to lawfully deploy troops on Nigerian soil. Nigerian military also operate beyond borders to hunt fleeing terrorists, thus removing their safe haven. Fourth, is the declaration of a state of emergency in the three most affected northern States, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe. Although, the absence of a specific Military Code of Justice to clearly identify intended targets and protect civilians has further increased the number of casualties in Northern Nigeria. Fifth, is that government encourages both public and media support to provide intelligence regarding terrorist groups or their activities.

The Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria has been a significant security challenge for the country, with the group carrying out deadly attacks and wreaking havoc in the north-eastern part of the country for over a decade. However, there have been recent efforts to encourage Boko Haram militants to surrender en masse, with the hope that this will weaken the group's fighting capacity and ultimately lead to the end of the insurgency. Recent events have shown that mass surrenders can indeed have a significant impact on the Boko Haram insurgency. In August 2021, over 1,000 Boko Haram militants surrendered to Nigerian authorities in the north-eastern State of Borno (Mc Quade, 2021). The surrender was the largest in the history of the conflict, and it included both fighters and their families. The Nigerian government has since promised to rehabilitate and reintegrate the militants back into society.



Reasons for the Mass Surrendering of Terrorists in Borno State

There are different schools of thought with divergent views with regards the surge in the mass surrendering of the terrorists in the North East particularly Borno State. Some argued that the diplomatic shuttles of the Borno state Government, the conspicuous fatigue of the terrorist in a protracted conflict, the roles of the traditional institutions and the role of other critical stakeholders informed the mass surrendering. While others are of the view that it was the military offensive that is responsible for the new narrative and others believed is the combination of both. Whichever side the pendulum of the argument swings, what is clear is that, all the arguments falls within the confines of kinetic and non-kinetic strategy. Below are some of the details for the mass surrendering.

a. Military Offensive

The series of military offensives both on land and air contributed immensely in decimating the terrorists thereby forcing them to embrace amnesty. The military over the years have conducted series of operation and has also change the operational nomenclature from divisional status to the current Theatre status. The North East Operation which is the current and the largest operational theatre of the Nigerian Armed Forces has witnessed a number of leadership transformation among which are General Leo Irabor former Chief of Defence staff, Lieutenant General F Yahyah, General CG Musa the current Chief of Defence Staff among others, all aimed at improving the war efforts in the theatre. Some of the major operations conducted thus far include Operation FLUSH I & II, Operation RESTORE ORDER, Operation BOYANA, Operation ZAMAN LAFIYA, and GAMA AIKI. Others were Operation RESCUE FINALE, Operation LAST HOLD, TURA-TAKAIBANGO and Operation DESERT/LAKE SANITY I & II. It is pertinent to states that the effect of the kinetic operations that were conducted over the years that decimated the terrorist and brought them to their knee. This eventually paved way for the non-kinetic strategy to have an in road in the overall war efforts. Abubakar (2022).

b. Demise of Abubakar Shakau

The demise of Abubakar Shekau is one of the key reasons for the mass surrender of the terrorists. Other subsidiary reasons are discussed below:

(1) The leader of Boko Haram terrorists group Abubakar Shekau committed suicide on 19 May 2021 because he preferred to be humiliated in the

afterlife than getting humiliated on earth by joining Al-Barnawi group Sabiu (2022).

(2) Some analysts believed that the demise of Abubakar Shekau would either end Boko Haram war in the region or witness mass defections of Boko Haram Group (BH) to Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

(3) His demise created a big vacuum in the command structure that could not be addressed immediately and Borno Model players took advantage of it.

c. Political Will

Political Will of the Executive Governor of Borno State Prof Umar Zulum, is one of the major factors responsible for the ongoing surrendering of Boko Haram and ISWAP fighters in the North East. He assured the repentant fighters that their request would be met as a pre condition for surrendering. Some of these request includes that they would not be taken to Giwa Barracks, that they should not be married with the DDR Camp in Gombe State known as Operation Safe Corridor and that, the State will rehabilitate, reconcile and reintegrate them into the society accordingly. Furthermore, the reception given to the first set of repentant fighters on arrival at the Shokari Camp on July 5, 2021 and the visit of His Excellency to the camp to address them encouraged a lot of them to drop their arms. Abdu Umar (2022).

d. The Condemnation of Ex-Terrorists

The acceptance of ex terrorists by the community people despite their atrocities was significant in the surrendering of the terrorists. This would go a long way in the reconciliation and healing process. On the 29 August 2021, the Borno State Governor, Prof. Babagana Umara Zulum organized one day stakeholders' meeting at the Multipurpose Hall of the Government House Maiduguri where issues of mass defection of BHT/ISWAP fighters were discussed. In attendance were members of the National and State Assemblies, Shehu of Borno, Borno Elders, Theatre commander Operation HADIN KAI and paramilitary commanders. Others were selected victims, traditional, religious leaders, sons and daughters of State as well as civil society organizations. According to Governor Babagana Zulum (2022), some of the repentant terrorists were forced to remain in the bush to function as farmers, cooks and domestic servants to the terrorist. He added that special consideration would be given to those categories during screening. Various stakeholders in Borno State agreed to accept and forgive the initial 3900 repentant Boko Haram



fighters who surrendered to troops and those willing to surrender. It is pertinent to state that the community people are truly willing to accommodate the ex-combatants though some victims believed they don't deserve to be forgiven as their remorsefulness and repentance is temporary and it's for pecuniary gains. This concern has been vindicated in some isolated issues where repentant terrorists return to the bush to continue their nefarious activities. DE radicalizing Ex-Boko Haram Members is a misplacement of priority stressed that the Federal Government cannot be resettling and pampering former terrorists while the country is still at war, (Efebeh, 2017, Ndume (2020; Efebeh 2022)). He further stated in the defense of his position that a particular terrorist attack in Damboa was orchestrated by a repentant Boko Haram member. According to the lawmaker, the repentant Boko Haram member was feeding the terror group with information regarding the movement of the army. Though an isolated case, it is important however to ensure a thorough vetting process with bio data of the ex-combatants captured at the point of surrendering. Also, the need to put in place a process of regular monitoring of the ex-combatants, during and after being reintegrated into the society is pertinent.

e. The Demise of Most Conservative Boko Haram Ideologists

The military offensive has neutralized a large number of the terrorist's commanders in series of encounters. The Borno State Government (2022) revealed that over 90 per cent of die-hard Boko Haram ideologists were killed as a result of military action or internal clashes among the terrorists. According to Ya Baana Musaid (2011) one of the spiritual leaders of Late Mohammed Yusuf "there are less than 10 persons that are alive out of 300 persons that started the Boko Haram struggle with Mohammed Yusuf" Also, over 95 percent of the surrendered fighters and farmers were forcefully conscripted to join the groups. Thus, the less than 5 per cent die-hard Boko Haram ideologists in the bush could not stop the over 90 per cent who are desirous to gain freedom. Therefore, it was easier for the players of Borno Model to dialogue and persuade most of them to lay down their arms and surrender.

f. Infighting between the Boko Haram group and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP).

(1) The infighting between BHT and ISWAP fighters became increasingly common and intense in Sambisa forest and Lake Chad region with both sides claiming victories. This is an indication that the ideological war is over and now they are fighting for power, dominance, positions and more importantly, it has become a business enterprise.

(2) In recent clash between BHT and ISWAP around Lake Chad both sides lost over 300 fighters. Now a lot of fighters from both sides are surrendering to troops in Baga and Monguno.

(3) Presently, over 300 BHT commanders and sub commanders have surrendered to NA troops since the inception of this programme.

The Benefits of Mass Surrendering to the Government /Military

The benefit of mass surrendering of Boko haram terrorists includes reduction in weapons and other equipment in their custody, shortage of manpower, low morale, demystification of terrorists, inability to recruit massively, divulging actionable intelligence to the government and the security agencies among others.

a. Reduction in Weapons and other Equipment

The mass surrendering of terrorists to the security agencies has reduced the weapon holding of the terrorists. The Borno state Model of the Disarmament, Demobilization, Deradicalisation, Reconciliation and Reintegration (DDDRR) made provisions for monetary value for valuable equipment turn in the cause of the disarmament program. The Borno State Government approved certain amount for turn in weapons ranging from ₦100,000 for pistol, ₦200,000 for AK47 others are contained in the table below (Ishaq 2023). The effort of the state government is commendable in this direction despite the lean resources and the economic downturn. The more equipment that are surrendered, the easier for the military to clear the remnants of the terrorist and the less the treat to the host communities .To avoid the terrorist returning to the bush, there is the need to sustained the program. Also important, is the need to review the cash reward upward to further encourage more terrorist to embrace the ongoing DDDRR program in conjunction with the Federal Government due to the huge financial implication.



CASH FOR WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENTS IN BORNO STATE DISARMAMENT DEMOBILIZATION DERADICALISATION RECONCILIATION AND REINTEGRATION MODEL

Serial (a)	Type of Weapons (b)	Amounts (c)	Remarks (d)
1.	Pistol	₦100,000.00	
2.	AK 47 Rifle	₦200,000.00	
3.	G3 Rifle	₦200,000.00	
4.	FN Rifle	₦200,000.00	
5.	PKT	₦300,000.00	
6.	PKGM	₦300,000.00	
7.	GPMG	₦300,000.00	
8.	Anti-Aircraft (AA)	₦400,000.00	
9.	Mortal	₦400,000.00	
10.	Gun Truck	₦2,000,000.00	
11.	Armour Fighting Vehicle (AFV)	₦2,000,000.00	

Source: Office of the Borno State Special Adviser on Security.

b. **Dearth of manpower.** The mass surrendering is negatively affecting the terrorist's manpower which is invariably affecting their ability to mobilize for the purpose of conducting major operations against the military. This informed their change of tactics of attacking isolated or soft targets, kidnapping, robbery, laying Improvised Explosives Devices (IED), extortion from farmers and cattle rustling. Azubuke (2023). The Borno model of the amnesty process is a good strategy that would facilitate a quick restoration of peace in North Eastern Nigeria and will further assist the critical stakeholders particularly government and the military in achieving their set mandates. There is the need for the government to ensure that all measures are emplaced to improve and accelerate the process in accordance with the global best practices.

c. **Low Morale.** The morale of the terrorists particularly their Commanders are at its lowest ebb due to the mass surrendering of the terrorist. Additionally, the military has been conducting some special operations targeted at apprehending or decimating the terrorists commanders. Decapitation operation since its commencement has dealt a huge blow on some key terrorists commanders which has immensely contributed to the mass surrendering of the terrorists who became demoralized after the arrest and neutralization of some of their key commanders. Shuaibu (2022). It has become increasingly difficult to raise a sizeable number from the BHT camp for the conduct of major operation. This translates to a huge advantage to the military in the furtherance of various ongoing operations.

d. **Demystification.** The terrorist abinitio and particularly their commanders were seen as people

who are spiritually invisible, hence cannot be neutralized. The death of their former leader Abubakar Shekau and other commanders eradicated that believed of the invisibility of their commanders which also forecloses the unnecessary risks that the foot soldiers were always embarking. It shows that their commanders are actually ordinary and not spiritually inclined as they were brain washed to believe. This demystification has become advantageous to the military in the cause of their meeting engagement with the terrorists. It further serves as the needed push for willing terrorists to surrender their arms and embrace peace.

e. **Inability to Recruits Unhindered**

The mass surrendering of the terrorists is a confirmation of the weakness of the terrorist consequent upon the decimation of the terrorists by the security forces. Also, the role of other stakeholders has been of utmost importance in blocking the recruitment channels of the terrorists. The strategy is a constraint in the terrorists recruitment drive. To sustain this gain, the security forces must ensure all the strategy already emplaced should be either maintained or improved upon. It is pertinent therefore for the state and the military to ensure that the large number of surrendeers is sustained with continuous improvement in the DDDRR camp to serve as incentives for those still in the bush to embrace the surrendering process.

f. **Provision of Actionable intelligence.** One of the advantages of the mass surrendering is the provision of intelligence by the ex-combatants which has led to the conducts of further successful operations across the theatre. Good number of the ex-combatant have been of high value in providing intelligence and also encouraging their colleague in



the bush to come and embrace peace thereby alleviating the initial fears that they are being lured to be killed by the security agencies. It is also important to states that some of the ex-combatants also play the double agents strategy by relaying information to some of their colleagues in the bush or luring security forces to ambush sites. There is the need for the military to be circumspect on some of the intelligence provided and the need to interrogate the authenticity of this information.

Concluding Remarks

The mass surrendering of the Boko Haram Terrorists in the North East is a pleasant and heartwarming development, particularly the recent surge being witnessed in Borno State and its contiguous territories. The Borno Model and camps of surrendered terrorists in Borno State has registered over 103,365 repentant terrorists. The effectiveness of this strategy has been a subject of debate, with some arguing that it is a viable option for ending the insurgency, while others criticize it as ineffective. On the one hand, the mass surrendering strategy has led to a decrease in the number of Boko Haram fighters in the Northeast Region of Nigeria. According to the International Crisis Group (2021), the strategy has helped to weaken the group by reducing their capacity to carry out attacks and recruit new members. At begin of the insurgency, the government deployed some strategies which include, the use of brute military force against insurgent groups and deployment of over 8000 troops into affected parts of northern Nigeria. Thereafter, approval was given by the international bodies with the consent of the Nigerian Government for the neighboring countries (Chad, Niger and Cameroon) to lawfully deploy troops on Nigerian soil. Nigerian military also operate beyond borders to hunt fleeing terrorists, thus removing their safe haven. The declaration of a state of emergency in the three most affected northern States, namely Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe and finally the government encourages both public and media support to provide intelligence regarding terrorist groups or their activities. Some reasons were advanced for the mass surrendering of the terrorists in the North East. The hybrid of Kinetic and no kinetic are reasons for the recent surge in the mass surrendering and they include a robust and round the year joint military offensives across the Theatre of Operations ,the political will, infighting between the two rival terrorists group, the demised of Abubakar Shekau, the decapitation of some military commanders, the condonation of ex combatants by the community among others .Some

of the benefits of the mass surrendering are the reduction in the arms and ammunition of the terrorists, the dearth in power as a result of the mass surrendering , provision of actionable intelligence among others.

To sustain and improve the continuous surrendering of the terrorists, there is the need for the Borno Model of the DDDRR to be expanded and comprehensive particularly in the area of rehabilitation and reintegration, there is the need for the security forces and the state government to ensure proper bio data capturing procedures are carried out on all combatants with regular monitoring of the combatants. It is also pertinent for the government of both Borno and the Federal government to synergies on providing adequate funding for the Borno Model of the DDDRR to meet global best practices.

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