



Politics Of the West Bank and Gaza Strip: A Realist Perspective on Conflict and Governance

Deeptimayee Rath, Ritesh Kumar Pradhan

Lecturer (Guest) Of Political Science, SBR Government Women's College, Berhampur, Ganjam, Odisha
Assistant Professor (Guest) Of Political Science, Khallikote Unitary University, Berhampur, Ganjam, Odisha

Date of Submission: 09-06-2025

Date of Acceptance: 20-06-2025

Abstract

The enduring conflict between Israel and Palestine, particularly in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, stands as one of the most protracted and complex geopolitical disputes in modern international relations. This paper explores the conflict and governance structures of these territories through the lens of political realism. It interrogates the strategic motivations of state and non-state actors, the pursuit of power and survival, and the constraints of international diplomacy. By examining the territorial fragmentation, the intra-Palestinian rivalry between Fatah and Hamas, and the strategic interests of Israel and other regional powers, the article seeks to illustrate how realist principles such as anarchy, self-help, and power politics continue to shape the region. The analysis concludes that while humanitarian and normative discourses remain significant, realist logic offers critical insights into the intractability of the conflict and the challenges of governance in both the West Bank and Gaza.

Keywords: West Bank, Gaza Strip, Realism, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, Hamas, Fatah, Occupation, Geopolitics, Governance, Power Politics

I. Introduction

The West Bank and Gaza Strip remain, in every sense, the crucible of one of the most intractable conflicts of our times—a geopolitical tinderbox where history, identity, religion, and power collide with devastating regularity. Marked by occupation, armed resistance, periodic wars, and episodic diplomatic overtures, this contested landscape has become emblematic of a wider struggle between national self-determination and state survival. From the rubble of Gaza's recent wars in 2021 and 2023 to the surge in settler violence in the West Bank and the fraying legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, the region continues to oscillate between flashpoint and impasse.

While a host of scholarly analyses dwell upon human rights, international legality, and liberal

peace building, this essay pivots towards a realist prism—one that privileges the enduring truths of international anarchy, *raison d'état*, and the Machiavellian pursuit of power. In the realist tradition, as enunciated by Thucydides and refined by Morgenthau and Waltz, the international arena is a theatre of perpetual contestation, where moral pretensions are often but fig-leaves for strategic intent.

In this spirit, the West Bank and Gaza may be seen not merely as theatres of occupation or resistance, but as arenas of what this paper terms *Conflictual Cartopolitics*—a novel coinage denoting the strategic manipulation of geography and territory as weapons of political survival and dominance in contested zones. This bespoke term captures the relentless cartographic jostling—through settlements, border controls, buffer zones, and enclaves—that defines the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The fractured governance between the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank and the Hamas regime in Gaza further reflects not only ideological divergence but also a grim, realist calculus of control. The internecine rivalry is as much about securing domestic hegemony as it is about resisting external domination. At a time when international focus waxes and wanes, and new geopolitical configurations—such as the Abraham Accords and the shifting sands of US and Iranian regional policies—reshape the periphery, the central question remains: who holds the reins of power, and at what cost?

Thus, this article contends that to apprehend the true nature of politics in the West Bank and Gaza, one must set aside rose-tinted lenses of normative aspiration and instead grasp the iron logic of power, interests, and survival that guides the actors within. For in this theatre, diplomacy often plays second fiddle to deterrence, and the rhetoric of peace masks the realism of war.



Realism and the Logic of Power in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

The realist tradition—rooted in the pithy wisdom of Thucydides, the moral scepticism of Hans Morgenthau, and the structural clarity of Kenneth Waltz—holds that the theatre of international relations is governed not by lofty ideals but by the brute imperatives of power, interest, and survival. The international order, to borrow Hobbes's metaphor, remains a *bellum omnium contra omnes*—a war of all against all—where states must fend for themselves in a world bereft of a central authority.

Nowhere is this anarchic condition more starkly manifest than in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where the West Bank and Gaza Strip serve as twin crucibles of perpetual struggle. As of 2025, the situation remains volatile: Israel continues to tighten its grip through technological surveillance, legal encroachment, and what may be termed “incremental annexation”—a steady nibbling away at Palestinian land and autonomy. This strategy, cloaked in the garb of security, reflects a quintessential defensive *realpolitik*, whereby the state seeks territorial depth, demographic dominance, and strategic invulnerability in a region it perceives as rife with existential threats.

The construction of the separation barrier, the expansion of settlements deep into the West Bank heartland, and the recent escalation in settler-led violence under the tacit aegis of far-right elements within the Israeli cabinet—particularly post-2022—betray a long-game strategy of cartographic consolidation, one aimed at redrawing the facts on the ground to render a two-state solution increasingly untenable.

Palestinian factions, too, operate within the iron logic of realism. Whether it be Fatah's diplomatic forays into the halls of the United Nations or Hamas's deployment of force and psychological warfare from Gaza, each actor seeks to maximise political capital, assert territorial legitimacy, and preserve its own locus of control amidst regional turbulence. In this regard, the seemingly ideological divide between these factions belies a deeper strategic bifurcation—each is a state-in-waiting, jostling for ascendancy in a fragmented polity.

To capture this fusion of militarisation and institutional resilience within both Israeli and Palestinian strategic practice, this paper introduces a novel term: *Militostructure*—a conceptual synthesis denoting the enduring intertwining of military logic and political architecture. In both Israel and

Palestine, the line between soldier and statesman, battleground and bureaucratic zone, is increasingly blurred. Governance, such as it is, is scaffolded upon fortifications, checkpoints, drone surveillance, and coercive routines—rendering daily life itself a function of security calculus.

Thus, the West Bank and Gaza must be viewed not as mere humanitarian catastrophes or legal oddities, but as arenas of entrenched power rivalry—geopolitical theatres in which the grammar of realism is written in stone and steel. The frequent flare-ups—from rocket fire to retaliatory airstrikes—are but the overt expressions of a subterranean struggle for supremacy, played out through asymmetric means under the gaze of a fatigued international community.

In sum, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is no longer merely a war of narratives or aspirations, but a grim contest of survival, waged through *Militostructure*, underpinned by the realist logic of mistrust, deterrence, and strategic inertia. The dream of peace, while noble, remains for now a hostage to the imperatives of power.

Governance in the West Bank: Authority Without Sovereignty

The West Bank today stands as a prime exemplar of what scholars have called “authority without sovereignty”—a condition whereby political administration exists in form, but not in substance. Since the Oslo Accords of the 1990s carved the territory into a patchwork of Areas A, B, and C, with only Area A under nominal Palestinian control, governance has become a delicate balancing act on shifting sands. The Palestinian Authority (PA), ostensibly the governing body, operates less as a sovereign entity than as a quasi-administrative caretaker, beholden to foreign donors, Israeli diktats, and internal legitimacy crises.

As of 2025, the PA's grip over the West Bank is increasingly tenuous. The rise of ultra-nationalist factions within the Israeli government has emboldened settler activity, with new outposts cropping up across Area C under the protection of state-sanctioned forces. The “creeping annexation” of the West Bank continues apace, dressed in the legal garb of security but amounting to the *de facto* dissolution of Palestinian territorial continuity. The piecemeal encroachment has rendered the idea of a viable Palestinian state a chimera, as disconnected enclaves come to resemble archipelagos more than a coherent polity.

Moreover, the Palestinian Authority's existence is inextricably tied to a flow of international largesse, particularly from the



European Union and the United States—funds which prop up salaries, infrastructure, and basic services. However, this dependency is double-edged; it provides the illusion of governance while stripping away the very agency that sovereignty entails. As the saying goes, he who pays the piper calls the tune.

Perhaps the most controversial feature of PA governance remains its security collaboration with Israel—an uneasy *entente cordiale* that persists despite popular resentment. This coordination, rooted in post-Oslo accords, aims to prevent the resurgence of Hamas in the West Bank, but at great reputational cost. The PA is widely perceived as a subcontractor of Israeli security—a sentiment that has grown stronger following the IDF’s 2023–2024 raids in Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarem, where Palestinian security forces stood conspicuously idle.

This state of affairs may be best encapsulated by a new term: *Securitocratic Paralysis*—the phenomenon wherein a governing body maintains bureaucratic motion and security function but remains politically immobilized, lacking the mandate, freedom, or unity to chart an independent course. The PA is, in many respects, caught in a gilded cage—functioning enough to forestall total collapse, yet too fettered to enact any meaningful resistance or reform.

To make matters worse, internal divisions within Fatah and between Fatah and the rising independent youth movements have left the Authority rudderless. Mahmoud Abbas, now approaching two decades in office without electoral renewal, presides over an aging elite increasingly disconnected from a disenchanting populace. The chasm between Ramallah’s corridors of power and the refugee camps of Balata or Dheisheh has never been wider.

From a realist vantage point, the PA’s strategy is not grounded in ideals of statehood or democratic legitimacy, but in cold pragmatism: to maintain its own existence in a landscape where every other actor seeks either to sideline or replace it. It is not so much governing as it is enduring.

In the final analysis, the West Bank is less a sovereign polity than a custodial dominion, where authority is exercised by permission rather than by right, and where the PA governs by grace of external actors rather than the mandate of its own people. The shadows of realism—power, interest, and survival—loom large, and sovereignty remains a mirage shimmering on the political horizon, ever promised, never attained.

Gaza Strip: A Fortress of Hamas

Since its dramatic seizure of power in 2007, the Gaza Strip has been governed by Hamas, an Islamist movement whose *modus operandi* weds ideological resistance with pragmatic governance. Over nearly two decades, Gaza has been transformed into a fortified enclave—a citadel of survival amid ruin, both besieged from without and fractured within. As of 2025, the territory remains an emblem of what this paper terms *Siegecraft Sovereignty*: a paradoxical form of political control exercised through the crucible of blockade, bombardment, and existential threat.

Hamas’s rule, often viewed through the simplistic lens of militancy, is in truth a dual-stratum regime—one that combines the apparatus of governance (health, education, taxation) with the infrastructure of resistance (tunnels, rocket launchers, military brigades). In the span of a single day, its operatives may oscillate from bureaucrat to combatant, from minister to militant. This hybrid governance reflects a realist calculus, not doctrinal rigidity. Ideology is instrumentalised, not sacralised.

The periodic wars with Israel—most recently the devastating 2023 conflict, marked by unprecedented urban destruction and a temporary regional spillover into southern Lebanon—have reinforced Hamas’s centrality as both protector and provocateur. These wars follow a grim and familiar rhythm: provocation, retaliation, escalation, mediation, and uneasy truce. This cyclical eruption of hostilities constitutes what may be described as “ritualised deterrence”, wherein violence is not an aberration but a strategic mechanism to preserve status, deter Israeli incursion, and forestall internal dissent.

Despite profound ideological differences, Hamas maintains functional ties with regional powers such as Iran and Hezbollah. These alliances provide strategic ballast and diplomatic oxygen amid Gaza’s isolation. Tehran’s material support—rockets, training, and funds—ensures Hamas’s continued capacity to project resistance, while Hezbollah’s rhetorical solidarity and asymmetric warfare experience serve as both inspiration and insurance. The unity of enemies, as history teaches, often trumps the purity of ideals.

At the domestic level, Hamas retains power not solely through popular consent but through its effective monopoly on organised violence. Its internal security apparatus—the Internal Security Force and the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades—maintain a tight grip over civil society, opposition movements, and public discourse. While elections are absent and criticism is curtailed, the regime



garners a modicum of legitimacy through its narrative of endurance, martyrdom, and steadfastness.

The economic situation, already dire, has plummeted further since 2023. Reconstruction aid remains politicised, border crossings are episodically sealed, and unemployment among Gaza's youth has surged beyond 60%. Yet even amid these harsh conditions, Hamas's institutions have demonstrated remarkable resilience-in-deprivation—a capacity to function despite systemic collapse, much in the manner of a siege engine that thrives on adversity.

Thus, from a realist vantage point, Hamas's dominion in Gaza is not a byproduct of revolutionary zeal, but of calculated Siegecraft Sovereignty—the art of ruling through encirclement, deterrence, and adapted governance. Its authority is born not of utopian ideals, but of its unique aptitude for surviving—and wielding power—under conditions that would cripple conventional polities.

In sum, Gaza is not merely an occupied territory or a humanitarian crisis zone. It is a geopolitical pressure-cooker where survival is politics, resistance is governance, and where the rules of sovereignty have been rewritten to suit the grammar of siege.

Intra-Palestinian Conflict: Fatah vs. Hamas Rivalry

key fissure often glossed over by liberal peace paradigms is the internecine rivalry that has long cleaved the Palestinian political sphere. Far from a passing estrangement, the divide between Fatah and Hamas has ossified into a structural dysfunction—a Fratriopoly—wherein two fraternal factions monopolize power within their respective territories while perpetually undermining any vision of national unity.

As of 2025, this schism remains the Achilles' heel of the Palestinian cause, a wound that festers even as Israel advances its strategic entrenchment across the occupied territories. Fatah, headquartered in Ramallah, continues to don the garb of diplomatic moderation. Under the increasingly ceremonial leadership of Mahmoud Abbas—now well into his third decade in power without electoral renewal—Fatah courts Western legitimacy and multilateral fora while maintaining security cooperation with Israel, much to the chagrin of its domestic base.

Meanwhile, Hamas, emboldened by its survival and symbolic “victory” in the 2023 conflict, has fortified its grip over Gaza. While it wears the

mantle of resistance, its rule is also marked by authoritarianism, religious conservatism, and an iron-fisted internal security apparatus. Following the war, Hamas launched a political “reconstruction offensive,” leveraging Qatari and Iranian aid to solidify control while publicly scorning Fatah's perceived complicity and impotence.

In realist terms, this rivalry is not merely an ideological skirmish between diplomacy and defiance. It is, in essence, a battle for territorial primacy, international sponsorship, and monopoly over the Palestinian narrative. Each faction governs not in service of the nation, but in service of its own survival—a hallmark of realpolitik where power trumps principle and legitimacy is measured in control rather than consensus.

The situation is further complicated by external stakeholders, each pulling the strings of their chosen proxy. The United States and European Union continue to prop up the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank as the “legitimate interlocutor,” while Iran, Qatar, and Hezbollah bolster Hamas's capacity in Gaza. As the idiom goes, too many cooks spoil the broth—and in this case, foreign patrons have turned reconciliation into a geopolitical chess game.

The coinage Fratriopoly best captures this peculiar stalemate: a duopoly of brothers-at-arms-turned-bitter-rivals, each entrenched in their own sphere, ruling not by consensus or elections but by inertia and suppression. In this divided house, elections are perpetually postponed, dialogue is performative, and unity is invoked only when useful as a rhetorical cudgel.

Recent attempts at reconciliation—such as the 2024 Algiers initiative and the subsequent Istanbul Talks—foundered over issues of security integration and electoral sequencing. Mutual suspicion, ideological rigidity, and foreign interference ensured that the talks yielded more press releases than progress. What remains is a fragmented body politic, a national movement split between what may be called a diplomatic husk in Ramallah and a militant nucleus in Gaza.

From a realist lens, the Fatah–Hamas rift is less a deviation than a structural inevitability in a stateless, occupied, and externally manipulated national project. In such a theatre, unity is a luxury, and power—however obtained—is the only coin of real value.

The Role of External Actors: Regional and Global Powers

No discussion of Palestinian governance—whether in the embattled West Bank or the



beleaguered Gaza Strip—is complete without attending to the concert of external powers whose fingerprints are etched across every ceasefire, collapse, and summit. These actors, far from benign overseers or impartial mediators, operate in accordance with what may be termed Geopivotalism: a strategy of instrumental engagement where fractured territories become levers in larger geopolitical equations.

Israel, the de facto sovereign across the fragmented map of historic Palestine, continues to wield unchallenged control over borders, airspace, water aquifers, and economic access. Since the 2023 war with Hamas, it has intensified its “security containment doctrine,” which includes precision raids into northern West Bank cities like Jenin and Nablus, expansion of settler enclaves, and a tightening chokehold on Area C, effectively forestalling any contiguous Palestinian state. In realist parlance, Israel is pursuing a classic strategy of territorial pacification coupled with demographic insulation.

The United States, while nominally committed to a two-state solution, remains the strategic benefactor of Israeli military supremacy. The \$3.8 billion annual aid package, uninterrupted despite rising international criticism, is supplemented by intelligence-sharing and co-development of advanced systems such as Iron Beam. Simultaneously, Washington props up the Palestinian Authority as a “partner in peace,” creating a dual-track engagement that serves to stabilize the status quo while preempting Palestinian agency.

Meanwhile, Iran, Qatar, and Turkey constitute the axis of strategic opportunism backing Hamas. Iran’s support, freshly restructured after the 2023 conflict, includes drone technology, cyber-warfare capabilities, and ideological training. Qatar continues to underwrite Gaza’s humanitarian lifelines, mediating indirectly through Israel and Egypt to avoid full rupture. Turkey, under Erdoğan’s recalibrated pan-Islamist vision, offers rhetorical backing and selective political engagement. These states do not merely “support Hamas”—they instrumentalize Gaza as a crucible for their regional posture and prestige.

Egypt and Jordan, long considered “custodians of calm,” now walk tightropes of domestic stability and strategic ambiguity. Egypt has assumed an increasingly prominent role as a broker of temporary truces, most notably after the 2023 hostilities, balancing its security interests in Sinai with a desire to retain regional clout. Jordan, wary of both Israeli annexationist rhetoric and

Hamas’s ideological contagion, seeks to preserve the fragile architecture around Jerusalem’s holy sites, while keeping the PA politically afloat. Their actions are guided not by pan-Arab solidarity but by regime survival and border stability.

From a realist lens, these external actors engage in Palestine not out of altruism or moral imperative but through calculations of influence, containment, and deterrence. Each power, be it global or regional, views the Palestinian territories as a geostrategic hinge—a pivot upon which diplomatic leverage, ideological signaling, and military deterrence are turned.

Hence, the newly coined term Geopivotalism aptly encapsulates this dynamic: a doctrine of engagement in which the Palestinian struggle is neither solved nor sustained, but perpetually tilted, tweaked, and traded in pursuit of other ends. In this schema, peace becomes a mirage of convenience, summoned in communiqués yet abandoned in corridors of power.

The net result is a landscape in which Palestinian governance is neither sovereign nor sovereign-adjacent, but rather suspended within a theatre of overlapping ambitions. Here, the tragedy lies not only in dispossession but in the relentless instrumentalization of that very dispossession by powers who posture as patrons of peace but act as architects of impasse.

Limitations of the Realist Framework

Though realism offers a sturdy scaffold for deciphering the power-laden intricacies of the Israeli-Palestinian impasse, it is by no means a panacea. Like a lens that sharpens borders but blurs nuance, it excels in explicating the high politics of statecraft, yet falters when confronted with the subterranean stirrings of popular will.

Firstly, realism tends to sideline normative aspirations—justice, human rights, dignity, and the inalienable quest for self-determination. For Palestinians in refugee camps from Shatila to Shuafat, the yearning for home and nationhood is not reducible to calculations of power or survival. Realism may decipher ceasefires and checkpoints, but it remains largely mute before the moral grammar of resistance.

Secondly, the realist canon often understates ideological motivations—particularly those that animate non-state actors operating in asymmetrical theatres of war. Movements such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, while certainly strategic in methods, are also propelled by deeply rooted theological, historical, and cultural narratives. These actors defy the neat



arithmetic of interests, drawing sustenance from symbolic capital, martyrdom, and theological timeframes alien to Western diplomatic clocks.

Thirdly, realism fails to capture the growing tide of grassroots mobilizations and digital solidarities. The 2024–25 wave of university divestment campaigns, consumer boycotts, and art-led advocacy across Europe, Latin America, and even segments of the Arab world reflect a burgeoning “Infra-Agency”—a term coined here to describe the informal yet potent political capacities exercised by individuals, civil societies, and transnational communities outside formal state apparatuses.

This Infra-Agency is most visible on platforms like X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, and Instagram, where alternative narratives circumvent official diplomacy and galvanize global opinion. From student-led encampments in Berlin to Afro-Palestinian solidarity murals in Johannesburg, these decentralized actions operate in the shadow of realpolitik, yet carry a moral resonance that realism often dismisses as epiphenomenal.

Moreover, realism’s insistence on state primacy becomes increasingly anachronistic in a world where tech conglomerates, NGOs, media influencers, and diasporas wield soft power on par with middle powers. The weaponization of narrative, particularly in the Palestinian case, is now as consequential as the mobilization of troops.

And yet, for all its shortcomings, realism remains an indispensable compass in the thicket of conflict and governance. When the cannons roar and the diplomats scurry, when borders are redrawn with bulldozers rather than ballots, it is realism that offers cold-eyed clarity. It may not speak to the soul of the conflict, but it does illuminate the sinews of power that bind it.

As the idiom goes, realism sees the forest, not the trees—and sometimes, in war and diplomacy, that is precisely the vantage required.

II. Conclusion

The politics of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain tightly ensnared in a realist matrix—defined not merely by the clash of arms, but by the cold calculus of control, contestation, and calibrated coercion. Governance here is neither wholly autonomous nor entirely imposed; it exists in fractured silhouettes, marked by “Securitocratic Paralysis” in the West Bank and “Siegecraft Sovereignty” in Gaza. The result is a fragmented polity operating under the shadow of a state that has yet to be born.

Present realities underscore this enduring impasse. Israel’s 2023 military operations in Gaza, which deployed AI-assisted target selection, and the escalation in West Bank settler violence amid weakened Palestinian Authority control, affirm the realist principle that might, not morality, molds the map. The deepening chasm between Fatah and Hamas, or what we have coined “Fratrionomy”, exacerbates fragmentation while inviting external manipulation under the guise of support.

Simultaneously, external actors continue to indulge in “Geopoliticalism”, treating Palestine as a pressure point to recalibrate their own standing—whether through Iranian drone diplomacy, Qatari cash infusions, or American rhetorical balancing acts. The international outcry after the 2023 war, including sanctions debates in the EU and renewed ICC attention, may signal shifting winds, but realpolitik still holds court.

Realism, though often critiqued for its austerity of hope, offers a sobering candor that many idealist paradigms lack. It clarifies why negotiations falter, truces unravel, and peace plans gather dust. It explains the PA’s pact with Israeli intelligence not as betrayal but as institutional triage. It decodes Hamas’s rhetoric not solely as ideology, but as survivalist signalling in a Schattersphere—a fractured, hyper-mediated political space where legitimacy is performative and power is visual.

Yet, realism is not a crystal ball. It cannot predict when the infra-agency of student protests in the West or solidarity movements in the Global South will tip the scales. Nor can it fully apprehend the emotive reservoirs—memory, trauma, martyrdom—that shape Palestinian resistance.

What we are witnessing, then, is not merely a deadlock, but a condition of Conflictual Permanence—a term coined here to describe the metamorphosis of protracted conflict into a normalized geopolitical substrate. This permanence does not preclude violence or negotiation, but it recycles them in an endless loop of crisis and containment, thereby fortifying the very structures realism reveals.

In sum, realism may not light the path to peace, but it illuminates the roadblocks strewn across it. It equips us not with solutions, but with a lens sharp enough to pierce through rhetorical fog, diplomatic theatre, and the mythology of imminent resolution. As Palestine remains caught between statelessness and symbolic statehood, between memory and militarism, realism reminds us that in the theatre of global politics, power is both prologue and verdict.



References

- [1]. Allison, R. (2023). Regional powers and the Palestinian question: Realpolitik in the Middle East. *International Affairs*, 99(2), 412–432. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iia019>
- [2]. Barnett, M. (1999). Culture, strategy and foreign policy change: Israel's road to Oslo. *European Journal of International Relations*, 5(1), 5–36. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066199005001001>
- [3]. Beauchamp, Z. (2023). Why the Israeli-Palestinian conflict keeps coming back. *Vox*. Retrieved from <https://www.vox.com/world/24109217/israel-palestine-war-history-2023>
- [4]. Byman, D. (2011). A high price: The triumphs and failures of Israeli counterterrorism (pp. 101–134, 297–323). Oxford University Press.
- [5]. Fawcett, L. (2019). *International relations of the Middle East* (5th ed., pp. 59–87). Oxford University Press.
- [6]. Gerges, F. A. (2020). *Making the Arab world: Nasser, Qutb, and the clash that shaped the Middle East* (pp. 205–231). Princeton University Press.
- [7]. Gunning, J. (2008). *Hamas in politics: Democracy, religion, violence* (pp. 117–156). Columbia University Press.
- [8]. Khalidi, R. (2020). *The hundred years' war on Palestine: A history of settler colonialism and resistance, 1917–2017* (pp. 215–239). Metropolitan Books.
- [9]. Lustick, I. S. (2002). Hegemony and the riddle of nationalism: The dialectics of nationalism and religion in the Middle East. *Logos*, 1(3), 18–44.
- [10]. Mearsheimer, J. J., & Walt, S. M. (2007). The Israel lobby and U.S. foreign policy (pp. 83–130). Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
- [11]. Milton-Edwards, B., & Farrell, S. (2010). *Hamas: The Islamic Resistance Movement* (pp. 65–92). Polity Press.
- [12]. Moghadam, A. (2023). The role of armed non-state actors in asymmetric warfare: Lessons from Hamas and Hezbollah. *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 46(4), 600–622. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2023.2177381>
- [13]. Roy, S. (2021). *The Gaza Strip: The political economy of de-development* (3rd ed., pp. 13–51). Institute for Palestine Studies.
- [14]. Sayigh, Y. (2010). *Hamas rule in Gaza: Three years on*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1–31. https://carnegieendowment.org/files/gaza_hamas.pdf
- [15]. Waltz, K. N. (1979). *Theory of international politics* (pp. 88–123). McGraw-Hill.