



Non-Violence in the 21st Century: Revisiting the Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict Resolution

Martin Marcelino Mwake
Dorine Adundo

Date of Submission: 01-08-2025

Date of Acceptance: 11-08-2025

Abstract

Conflict resolution has been an area of concern for researchers, leaders and stakeholders in the area of conflict resolution. There has been increased use of Gandhian philosophy of non-violence conflict resolution where he argues that the most ideal conflict resolution with lasting results was non-violence methods of resolution. The aim of the study was to evaluate the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence conflict resolution as applied in the 21st Century. The study used case study where four states where non-violence resistance were studied including Nigeria, Sudan, Myanmar and Lebanon. The study used text analysis where existing documents were reviewed so as to present non-violence as the formidable strategy for conflict resolution in the 21st Century. The study established that all the states used non-violence with varying degrees of success. In Niger Delta, Nigeria, the strategy was successful in attracting the attention of the international community and the multinationals which imposed sanctions on the oil product from the region. However, following the execution of the mastermind, Ken Saro-Wiwa, the militants embarked on violent acts which degenerated the crisis rather than alleviate. In Sudan however, the campaign was much successful as the outcome brought substantial change for the future. In Lebanon, the outcome was not pleasant, though they managed to elect new government which pushed the Hezbollah to the backseat. This however may not be sustainable as the system the Lebanese demanded has not changed. The Myanmar, appear to be shifting towards constructive resistance which may be pushing Myanmar towards a new civil war. The study however concludes that non-violence seem to provide the best methods for conflict solution.

Key Words: Non-Violence, Conflict Resolution, Conflict

I. Introduction

It is asserted that conflict, whether it be between individuals, groups, organizations, or

nations, is a natural state and stage of human interaction. Conflict is innate in all social interactions and between people, according to Hobbes et al. (2002) and Morgenthau (1973), and the forces that drive conflict or imperfection in the world are forces that are present in human nature. However, this is only true if and when it is viewed as providing justification for conflict to exist in regular interpersonal interactions or that conflict is regular in the sense that it occurs. According to Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), conflict is defined as a disagreement in which both sides see a danger to their needs, interests, or concerns. It happens as a result of a perceived threat to their physical, emotional, power, status, etc. wellness. The situation involving two or more parties in which the pursuit of opposing aims, objectives, or interests results in varied degrees of disagreement can be summarized by these definitions (Sharp, 2005). The main distinction is typically between cordial and cooperative interactions and an adversarial confrontation that is more disruptive and, at its worst, violent, leading to violent conflict.

A way to achieve the state of company is through managing and analyzing conflict in the forms of conflict settlement, conflict resolution, conflict transformation, and conflict prevention. Peace in human society is brought about via conflict resolution. Conflict resolution refers to a group of strategies and procedures for settling disputes that are focused on averting, ending, or altering violent conflict through the use of measures judged acceptable (Miall, 2015). The fundamental step in creating new conflict resolution strategies is addressing the problem's root cause. Conflict resolution is the "process of resolving a dispute or a conflict, by effectively considering each side's interests and demands such that they are satisfied with the outcome." Thus, the goal of conflict resolution is to remove the root causes of conflict. Conflict resolution techniques have been used in various ways. However, physical violence has been the method most frequently employed to silence critical voices. However, scholars have condemned



violent conflict resolution as usually creating a mimetic cycle that is challenging to break. It often results in more violent behavior. Violence did not resolve any problems; rather, it only led to greater violence (Mendizza 2000). Violence is cyclical; even when fighting against clear injustice or institutionalized violence, a violent uprising will set off a ruthless, violent reaction by the ruling class, which will only serve to intensify the original wrongdoing or institutionalized violence. Therefore, resorting to violence in order to settle disputes with the intention of preventing further conflict is not the best course of action (Mendizza 2000).

By addressing the needs and ambitions of the populace through the non-violent method of conflict resolution known as Satyagraha, Mahatma Gandhi responded to the problems of his time. It is predicated on the idea that a devoted person is capable of finding innovative solutions to issues. It also posits that conflicts can shift from competitive to cooperative on a continuum. The Gandhian approach places additional stress on coming to the truth: here, satisfaction of all parties to the conflict with the outcome is much more important than victory or winning. A shared commitment to "social transformation and enhanced fairness via peaceful methods" is expressed in the nonviolence resolution (Lederach 1995, 15). Gandhi's nonviolent approach to conflict resolution has drawn praise and criticism in equal measure as the best strategy for resolving disputes and producing sustainable change. Therefore, further research in this area is necessary in order to prove non-conflict as a powerful paradigm, technique, and conflict resolution strategy. This article's main goal is to portray Gandhi's nonviolent philosophy as a powerful framework, technique, and conflict resolution strategy for the twenty-first century.

Objective of the Study

The aim of the study was to evaluate the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence in conflict resolution as applied in the 21st century.

The present work adopted an encompassing theoretical consideration backed up by theoretical and empirical evidence from studies on conflict resolution.

II. Literature Review

Gandhian Philosophy of Conflict Resolution

In South Africa, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi came up with the word "Satyagraha" to describe the force that Indians there employed in

their struggle for basic respect and rights. The phrase has also been translated as "militant nonviolence," "passive resistance," "nonviolent resistance," and even "nonviolent direct action" (Weber, 1991: 2). Holding onto "truth" is the fundamental concept of satyagraha, thus the term "truth force." It is made up of the two terms sati and agraha. The word Satya comes from Sanskrit 'Sat' meaning 'being' or to exist 'eternally'. Truth is the only thing that truly exists forever. Absolute truth also refers to God. Truth is thus God. Agraha signifies clinging tenaciously to the truth. The Satyagraha tenet was a political application of the family-centered rule. Gandhi believed that the "Law of Love" usually resolved family conflicts and disagreements. Because of his high regard for the other members, the injured member allowed himself to be hurt for the sake of his beliefs without taking revenge or becoming enraged with those who disagreed with him. He didn't elevate trivial matters into principles because controlling his anger and practicing self-suffering were difficult processes. Instead, he readily agreed with the rest of the family on all non-essential matters, continuing to achieve the greatest amount of peace for himself while avoiding upsetting others. Thus, whether he resisted or quit, his actions were always intended to advance the welfare of his community. As a result, his actions, whether he opposed or quit, were always intended to advance the wellbeing of his family as a whole.

The Gandhian approach to conflict resolution is a movement that seeks to replace violent approaches with nonviolent ones that are only grounded in the truth (Bondurant, 1988). The three main pillars of this philosophy are truth, nonviolence, and self-suffering. Gandhi saw truth as a crucial component of his strategy because he thought it to be humanity's greatest motivator and that man's pursuit of the truth is what keeps him going. Gandhi never asserted to know the truth in any absolute sense, according to Bondurant, but he frequently reminded people that because man cannot know the truth, he must cultivate and uphold an unceasingly open disposition toward those who would disagree with him. Because it enables the parties to see the conflict from one another's perspectives, this strategy is particularly important in conflict resolution. The act of entering into discussions with preconceived beliefs regarding the motivation of the other side, so maintaining a closed mind to further inquiries, is typically one of the greatest barriers to effective dispute resolution. Gandhi argued for a relentless search for and study



into the truth because, once discovered, it becomes a lethal weapon for further conquest. He also made clear that the search of truth did not permit inflicting harm on one's adversary; rather, such an adversary needed to be weaned from error by compassion and patience. This is important because what one party sees as reality could be mistake for the other party to see.

The Indian word "Ahimsa," which signifies that one may not insult anyone or have uncharitable thoughts even towards someone who may feel oneself to be one's enemy, captures the non-violent idea of the Gandhian philosophy. This principle is founded on the willful avoidance of damage. It is crucial to always act in a non-violent manner when pursuing justice in order to gain the trust and support of those around you. Gandhi underlined that confronting a dictator with one's entire soul, rather than meekly complying with their wishes, is what Gandhi meant by nonviolence (Prabhu & Rao, 1996). According to him, nonviolence has a greater impact in combating wickedness than revenge, which by its very nature only serves to make things worse. When the perpetrator's anticipation of physical resistance is disappointed, violence can be stopped more effectively. Gandhi once said that "the acid test of non-violence is that there is no rancor left behind in a non-violent conflict, and in the end, the foes are made into friends" (Prabhu & Rao, 1996, 327).

Gandhi did not encourage surrender when he spoke of self-suffering; rather, he urged developing the highest level of sacrifice capacity, which would lead to the overcoming of fear. He held the view that in addition to learning the art of murdering during one's preparation for violence, one also needs to acquire the art of dying during one's preparation for nonviolence. The core of this tenet is the willingness of the participants in the battle to forgo their physical comfort in exchange for the campaign's goal. Self-suffering also refers to the practice of using one's own pain to expose social injustices. He emphasized the need for conflict resolution regardless of the circumstances (do not fight forever, always seek negotiation, seek positive social transformation, and seek transformation of both oneself and the opponent); that one should insist on essentials rather than non-essentials (do not trade with essentials, be willing to compromise on non-essentials); that one should see oneself as fallible (be aware that you may make mistakes); and that one should see one's opponent as one's equal (be aware that you may (do not exploit their

weaknesses, do not judge them harder than yourself, trust them); and finally, one should strive for conversion rather than coercion (find solutions that both you and the opposition can embrace; never coerce the opposition; convert the opposition into a believer in the cause).

The Satyagrahis object is to convert, not to coerce, the wrong doer, according to Harijan (1939), and "It is the acid test of non-violence that, in a non-violent conflict, there is no rancor left behind, and in the end the enemies are converted into friends" (Harijan, 1939). It is frequently forgotten that a Satyagrahi never intends to embarrass the wrongdoer (Harijan, 1938). For Gandhi, the only course of action in a conflict situation is to stick to nonviolence in thought, word, and deed, and the only objective is to discover the truth (and ultimately the Truth). The opponent (for Gandhi, there may be opponents but never foes) is not required to expose themselves to loss because good ends can never come from wrong means. Idealistically, there is no danger, pressure, or punishment. Instead, Gandhi's plan calls for "self-suffering" in the hope that the other person will be persuaded to recognize the truth by being touched by it, or that both sides can come to a greater understanding of the truth through the dialectical process.

Richard Gregg, an American, was one of the first to research and comprehend Gandhi's legacy. Gregg created the idea of moral jiu-jitsu in his book *The Power of Nonviolence* (1934), where he made the case that the moral benefit of nonviolence is so significant that it may throw opponents off guard. Additionally, he asserted that law enforcement and security personnel who use violence against nonviolent actors would be horrified by their actions, highlighting the influence of compassion and moral principles (Gregg, 1934).

Gene Sharp (1973) explained how Gandhi's work, which combined with the Satyagraha philosophy to include elements like a clear goal, conversion, noncooperation, disobedience, and constructive resistance, had influenced him. Gandhi's theory of power was based on the idea that the power of a government or ruler is conditional on the obedience, cooperation, and submission of their citizens or subordinates. Sharp (1973), who continued to create his own extremely noteworthy nonviolent resistance strategy with further input from academics like Gregg and others, maintained that nonviolence is more effective than its opponent



violence. He made the case that specific circumstances must be met in order for a nonviolent struggle to be successful rather than based his arguments on the moral obligation to abstain from using violence. These conditions are intricately tied together, and individual cases may have varied combinations of the conditions. Sharp outlined 198 different nonviolent action strategies, but he placed a strong emphasis on coercion, accommodation, and conversion. Sharp emphasized the necessity of maintaining discipline within these three overarching processes, the division of power, mass action, and what he called "political jiu-jitsu," which is a concoction of tactics intended to provoke a backlash or a change in public opinion that will favor the nonviolent resistance movement (Sharp, 1973).

Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler (1994) argued that the international response to human rights abuses inspired the use of nonviolent strategies. They listed twelve factors and divided them into three categories: engagement, development, and conception. Engagement factors included maintaining nonviolent discipline and defection. Development factors included factors like clear goals, mass action, and diverse methods. However, they went on to say that these elements could influence the success or failure of nonviolent resistance (Ackerman & Kruegler, 1994).

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) described civil resistance as psychological, social, economic, and political techniques, such as protests, strikes, boycotts, sit-ins, stay-aways, and other measures of noncooperation, to mobilize the people in order to undermine rivals and topple the foundations of power. Additionally, they define violent resistance as the application of violent tactics against nonstate actors' infrastructure, people, and property, including kidnapping, bombing, and physical sabotage (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). They also adhere to Ackerman and Kruegler's (1994) definition of a campaign, which is a set of observable and persistent techniques used to advance a political goal over the course of days or years. Campaigns frequently have a name and a visible leader (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).

According to Chenoweth (2021), there have been more nonviolent campaigns during the past two decades than there have been over the course of the whole 20th century. Chenoweth asserts that there are a number of causes for the rise in nonviolent campaigns, one of which is that the

number of authoritarian nations has increased over the past ten years. Chenoweth goes on to suggest that this may be a sign that people all over the world believe it is important to organize against oppression. According to Chenoweth's research (2021), 50% of all nonviolent revolutions were successful between 1900 and 2019. However, the data also reveals that after 2010, both the efficacy and success percentages of all revolutions have decreased. Even while the relative success rate of nonviolent campaigns has increased from two to one to three to one compared to violent campaigns, the total effectiveness of revolutionary activities has decreased in the short term (Chenoweth, 2021).

Chenoweth offers a few theories for why nonviolent resistance tactics have become less effective over the past ten years. First, nonviolent resistance campaigns may be up against more oppressive governments that are aiming to stifle them by tactics like imprisoning opponents, delegitimizing them through rumors, or inciting nonviolent resistance campaign participants to resort to violence.

Second, governments are becoming more aware of and receptive to nonviolent resistance movements. According to Chenoweth, authoritarian regimes may not have recognized the strength of the populace in the past, whereas a nonviolent resistance movement is more frequently perceived as a danger to the authoritarian regime today..

Campaigns for nonviolent resistance have grown in popularity, and governments have had more examples to study in order to refine their political repression strategies. The drop in success may have been influenced by these theories, but Chenoweth contends that they are not the main causes. Instead, the qualities of the campaign as a whole are what really matter (Chenoweth, 2021).

III. Methodology

The paper reviews four countries on a case study basis, which have either used or ongoing nonviolence movements that have the goal to achieve maximalist goal such as regime change, championed by Chenoweth and Stephan in their quest to prove the effectiveness of nonviolence campaigns. The three countries chosen are located in different areas, Nigeria and Sudan in Africa, Myanmar in Asia and Lebanon in Middle East, all having a history of colonialism but have since gained their sovereignty and have experienced instances of democracy but all have been riddled with economic and climate hardship, violent conflicts, and civil wars. The paper used text



analysis as a tool to present non-violence as the formidable strategy for conflict resolution in the 21st Century.

IV. Findings

Nigeria - Niger Delta

The Ogoni people of the Niger Delta's rights were championed by Ken Saro-Wiwa. The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MASOP), which was founded exclusively to address perceived injustice in Ogoni territory, was led by him. The actions of the oil and gas sector had utterly destroyed the neighborhood. Anglo-Dutch Shell, Chevron, Texaco, Exxon, and Agip were just a few of the international oil firms that Saro-Wiwa spearheaded a campaign against because they, in his opinion, expropriated land and polluted the land, water, and air. destroyed the populace's agriculture sector without contributing to the local economy (African Writers Abroad, 1995)..

Saro-Wiwa's civil rights movements were characterized by nonviolent and peaceful action, for which he cited Gandhi as an example (African Writers Abroad, 1995). He made a movie with shots of gas flares blazing continuously close to shacks and "basic schools" with metal roofs. have deteriorated as a result of acid rain. The movie also showed high-pressure oil pipelines cutting through Ogoni settlements and agriculture. The Niger Delta's situation, and specifically Ogoni land, came to the attention of the United Nations thanks to Saro-Wiwa's nonviolent strategy (Amodu, 2007).

On November 10, 1995, Saro-Wiwa and nine other Ogoni activists were assassinated by the Nigerian military government led by Gen. Sani Abacha. Nevertheless, his vital support of nonviolent action and unwavering fight for civil rights in the Niger Delta continues to have an impact. Following his execution, the British government put pressure on Shell to leave Nigeria (In Search of Succor, 1994), private investors sold off their Shell stock in Britain, and US Shell disassociated itself from all ties to the country. Additionally, Russia and South Africa withdrew their envoys, and the European Union (EU) called for a global oil boycott of Nigeria (Investors Dump Shell, 1995).

Given the discussion that followed, it is clear that the Gandhian Philosophy of non-violence as used by Saro-Wiwa in the Niger Delta garnered more support from the international community than the violence used by militants to achieve their goals.

In fact, even 10 years after Saro-Wiwa's passing the non-violent philosophy was still praised as African Writer Abroad commemorated the event in 2005. The organization stressed its adherence to Saro-philosophy Wiwa's of using non-violent and peaceful means of resolving disputes (African Writers Abroad. 1995).

Sudan

Sudanese people are often associated with social unrest. For instance, in the anti-government demonstrations that called for nationwide strikes until their demands were met in 1964, tens of thousands of nonviolent individuals went to the streets. Two weeks later, President Ibrahim Abboud resigned, the military was overthrown, and a transitional administration took over (Hasan, 1967).

Students were protesting the International Monetary Fund, the United States' involvement, and the rising food costs by the end of March 1985. (IMF). A nonviolent campaign developed as a result, calling for the repeal of the 1983 Sharia laws put in place by President Jafaar Numeiri, the abolition of foreign policy, and the resignation of the administration. Within a week, between one and two million protesters crowded Khartoum, the capital. President Numeiri was overthrown in a coup on April 6, 1985, which was orchestrated by military defectors. Additionally, they created a Transitional Military Council (TMC). Sadly, coups have also occurred in Sudan in the past, in addition to revolutions. Omar al-Bashir was installed in office in a coup in 1989, just like Abboud and Numeiri before him. He would rule for 30 years (Salih, 1990).

After assuming power, Omar al-Bashir created a military junta centered on the coalition of a political party that in 1996 launched the National Congress Party (NCP), which would rule until al-Bashir's overthrow. Al-Bashir expanded the Islamization of Sudan, privatized governmental businesses, enacted troubling policies, and placed a focus on ethnic hierarchies throughout his time in power. Discrimination against non-Arabic communities exacerbated racial and regional division and bloodshed in Sudan, making it nearly hard for those people to come together. This gave al-Bashir the impression that his hold on power would eventually come to an end (Awad, 2022).

The Sudanese had witnessed and endured violence, racism, corruption, and socio-economic issues for many years. People had had enough when



IMF pressure led to the elimination of fuel and food subsidies. Midway through December 2018, areas outside of Khartoum saw the first protests. Soon enough, people from all walks of life came together in Khartoum and peacefully demanded the end of al-cruel Bashir's tyranny and the establishment of democracy, ushering in the Sudanese Revolution (Bassil & Zhang, 2021). Due to the economy's decline, a group of professionals including journalists, attorneys, and doctors already created the Sudanese Professional Association in 2016. (SPA). By introducing the Declaration of Freedom and Change, which called for democracy, sustainable economic development, and al-departure, Bashir's the SPA laid the groundwork for the Sudanese Revolution. The Declaration of Freedom and Change brought together a range of different organizations, including those that advocate for women's rights, civil rights, political parties, and more. These organizations later came together to establish the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) (Grewal, 2021). The NCP eventually withdrew as Sudanese protestors remained unified and persistent, which allowed al-Bashir to impose a state of emergency on February 22, 2019. As a result of the protesters' discipline and fortitude throughout March, the military in early April ultimately recognized the imminent changes and switched their allegiance from the government to the peaceful demonstrators, which led to al-ouster Bashir's on April 11 2019.

The former vice president established a TMC, but the public disapproved of this action and returned to the streets to demand his resignation. General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan "Hemeti" Dagalo, the head of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), who were the main perpetrators of the atrocities in Darfur that the International Criminal Court has deemed to be acts of ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, took his place within 24 hours. The peaceful movement lasted despite Al-Burhan and Hemeti's leadership being unsatisfactory (Awad, 2022; Bassil & Zhang, 2021). A 61-day-long sit-in has been going on in front of the military headquarters in Khartoum until, on 3 June 2019, a sizable portion of the TMC and RSF violently murdered over 100 individuals to disperse the sit-in. The Khartoum Massacre is the name given to the incident today. However, due to divisions within the armed services, some of them ultimately swooped in to defend the peaceful protestors (Awad, 2022). The AU imposed sanctions and suspended Sudan as a result of the brutal incident. A few weeks after the

Khartoum Massacre, the people returned to the streets because they never gave up, not even in the face of oppression. The FFC and the TMC agreed on a 39-month power-sharing transitional government through mediation and UN pressure in August 2019, which would ultimately result in elections by the end of 2022. Following the inauguration of General Al-Burhan and Prime Minister (PM) Abdalla Hamdok in September 2019, sanctions were lifted and the country was readmitted to the AU. Even when some Sharia law provisions were repealed, the power-sharing transitional government made little headway. Power-sharing is not a flawless paradigm, though (Awad, 2022; Bassil & Zhang, 2021).

General Al-Burhan planned a coup with the assistance of his deputy, Hemeti, the minister of finance, and the governor-general of Darfur on October 25, 2021, or just under four weeks before he was supposed to transfer control to a civil representative. General Al-Burhan seized control, proclaimed an emergency, disbanded the power-sharing transitional government, and imprisoned cabinet members and party leaders who supported democracy, including Prime Minister Hamdok.

In the meantime, armed forces occupied state television, the internet was shut down, and Khartoum's airport, highways, and bridges were all stopped (Castellote, 2022).

Al-Burhan claimed in a speech the day after the coup that this step was taken to maintain the path toward democracy and to avert a civil war (Khaier, 2022). Until a compromise between the military and PM Hamdok was reached in November 2021, when it was decided that the constitutional declaration from 2019 would be implemented, PM Hamdok was held under house arrest. The international community welcomed the agreement, but citizens rejected it. Twelve cabinet ministers resigned as a result, and tens of thousands of protesters once more thronged the streets to call for a civil government, the release of political prisoners, and the exclusion of the military from the incoming administration. As a result, Hamdok submitted his resignation in January 2022, and the military continues to hold control (Castellote, 2022). The push for the non-violence revolution by the Sudanese has shown the power of the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence conflict resolution.

Myanmar

The people of Myanmar are accustomed to both violent confrontation and revolutions led by nonviolent opposition. General Win led a military



coups in 1962, overthrowing the democratically elected officials with the help of the Tatmadaw. Oil workers protested the Tatmadaw nonviolently in the middle of 1974; the Tatmadaw responded by opening fire, killing up to 100 people. General Win's plan to stay in power was to swiftly eliminate any form of opposition (Maizland, 2022; Pollard, 2015).

At least 100 students were killed by the Tatmadaw in the Bloody Friday Massacre at the beginning of 1988, sparking a revolution that was established in mid-August when millions of people marched through the capital and hundreds of thousands marched throughout the rest of the country, calling for democracy (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011). The aggressive Tatmadaw remained in control after General Win quit and transferred authority to another general (Maizland, 2022; Pollard, 2015). Aung San Suu Kyi rose to prominence as the face of the democracy movement during the 1988 resistance campaign. Suu Kyi and other opposition figures established the National League for Democracy (NLD) after unsuccessful attempts to overthrow the Tatmadaw, but in 1989 the Tatmadaw arrested Suu Kyi and other NLD members. She spent 21 years behind bars and on house arrest until being released in 2010 (Maizland, 2022).

Twenty years later, the Tatmadaw was once more seriously contested. In 2007, widespread nonviolent protests were sparked by appalling living conditions. The Buddhist monks wearing saffron robes were the main protagonists of the Saffron Revolutions. They immediately gained legitimacy by calling for nonviolent protests to demand democracy and the Tatmadaw's departure. Soon enough, the movement was characterized by large-scale protests (Pollard, 2015). In contrast to 1988, the Tatmadaw did not start out by using severe violence; instead, they started a propaganda campaign. As public support for the campaign rose, however, the Tatmadaw intensified its use of violence. The violence quickly escalated to the point where some fled the nation or went into hiding (Selth, 2008). The Tatmadaw appeared to retreat slightly in response to international pressure while drafting the 2008 constitution that gave them broad authority in the event of civilian administration. The constitution still in effect today guarantees the military seats in the parliament as well as complete control over internal security. By 2011, a transitional civilian-military government which was actually predominately military had been established after the Tatmadaw had been formally dispersed.

Suu Kyi became the de facto leader of Myanmar in 2015 after Myanmar held its first multiparty elections. Despite this, the Tatmadaw maintained a significant amount of control (Maizland, 2022).

The International Court of Justice had a lawsuit ongoing against Tatmadaw leaders for the alleged genocide against Rohingya Muslims, and the NLD was up against a Tatmadaw-backed party during the 2020 elections. Suu Kyi helped the NLD win the polls by defending the Tatmadaw and refuting the accusations (Mahaseth & Tulsyan, 2022). The Tatmadaw detained President Win Myint and State Counselor Suu Kyi as well as NLD members on February 1st, 2021, after General Min Aung Hlaing, commander-in-chief, declared that the elections had been rigged. Additionally, General Hlaing dismissed 24 ministers and replaced them with 11 of his picks. He also proclaimed a state of emergency (Mahaseth & Tulsyan, 2022). In a nutshell, in the whole process, the Gandhian philosophy of non-violence conflict resolution did not achieve much as the conflict degenerated to more violence than a solution.

Lebanon

Syria has put pressure on the Lebanese parliament in mid-2004 to extend Emile Lahoud's current pro-Syria presidency's tenure by three more years. This was not ignored, and neither was the international community or Lebanon happy about it (Kurtulus, 2009). While this was happening, ties between Syria and Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri were deteriorating, which had consequences that were apparent in Beirut on February 14, 2005, when a car bomb exploded, killing 23 people, including PM Hariri and sparking the Cedar Revolution. Numerous Lebanese citizens protested in the streets, accusing the Syrian government of murder, and calling for the Syrian military to leave Lebanon (Sutton, 2014). People have been peacefully protesting for weeks in order to urge the overthrow of pro-Syrian President Lahoud and his administration, which is led by Omar Kamari. In time for elections, Bashar al-Assad, the president of Syria, withdrew all Syrian troops from Lebanon by the end of April 2005, and Kamari resigned. As a result, a government was established through a power-sharing arrangement between two parties. Even if the anti-Syrian protests were peaceful and the demonstrators succeeded in their goal of driving out Syrian forces, the backdrop of rising sectarianism and a focus on security issues had a severe knock-on effect on the economy (Kurtulus, 2009; Sutton, 2014).



Lebanon saw a rash of violent internal and external crises between 2006 and 2010. (Doyle, 2016; Rizkallah, 2017). In contrast to other countries, Lebanon's 2011 Arab Spring sought to destroy the entire political order that had been in place since the conclusion of the civil war, not just a dictatorship. The movement shifted and reappeared in 2013 after the parliament extended its term in violation of the Constitution. However, the movement was insufficient to affect widespread participation or have a political impact (Halabi, 2019). The movement reappeared in 2015 as a result of a trash crisis. However, the movement failed to coalesce around a common cause because of this (Halabi, 2019)..

Following the May 2018 elections, a power-sharing administration was formed, this time with Hezbollah and the Free Patriotic Movement led by President Michel Aoun (Halabi, 2019). There were several problems in 2018 and 2019, including political squabbles, an economic emergency, and more than 100 wildfires that raged over Lebanon. Violence broke out between followers of various sectarian political groups at the same time. The government's announcement that new taxes, including a WhatsApp tax, would be levied in response to the economic crisis provided the final nail in the coffin (Lebanon's October 2021).

On October 17, 2019, tens of thousands of Lebanese people marched to the streets across the nation to call for social and economic reforms, an end to corruption, and ultimately the resignation of all political leaders. This was the official launch date of the October Movement.

Since the beginning, the government has responded to nonviolent protesters with tear gas, rubber bullets, beatings, and occasionally live ammunition. Even though the Saad Hariri government was forced to resign as a result of the widespread protests, the demonstrators persisted in their protests because they believed that little had actually changed.

Although Hassan Diab's new administration was put in place in January 2020, protesters persisted in calling for the overthrow of the political order and, as a result, the resignation of the administration as well as an end to sectarianism. Nearly 3,000 tons of ammonium nitrate exploded in the port of Beirut on August 4, 2020, leaving over 300,000 people homeless, more than 6,500 hurt, and

more than 200 dead. This horrific incident gave rise to the October Movement, which called for accountability and the overthrow of the entire political system. As a result, Hassan Diab's government resigned (Global Protest., 2022). Saad Hariri was given the responsibility to establish a new government, but because he was unable to do so, he once again resigned in July 2021. (Chehayeb, 2021). A new administration headed by billionaire businessman Najib Mikati was formed and chosen by the same political class that the Lebanese people have been striving to oust after 13 months of deadlock. Over 75% of Lebanese people live in poverty as a result of the Lebanese pound's 95 percent value decline from 2019 to the present (Chehayeb, 2022).

V. Conclusion

The analysis has revealed that the Gandhian non-violence conflict resolution philosophy is today widely used to find solution to the problems in the society. There has however been mixed results the philosophy has been widely praised for its success in conflict resolution. The opposite is however true in some countries where non-violent revolts have been met with brutality leading to more deaths and even degenerating to civil war. In the review, Sudan is making the most progress and has the best outcome for achieving not just the goal to overthrow the regime but has been successful in creating substantial change for the future. The resilience of the pro-change bore fruits elevating nonviolence as the best strategy or method for conflict resolution. For the case of Niger Delta, Saro-Wiwa's strategy of non-violence campaign against the injustice against the Ogoni people by the oil and gas industry, bore fruit as they got the attention of the international community as they started imposing sanctions against the oil companies to force them stop the atrocities against the Ogoni people. However, execution of Saro-Wiwa marked the end of non-violent resistance and increased violence. It is recorded that the gains were enormous as the rights of the Ogoni people is today observed. However, the continued violence in the area has degenerated the crisis rather than alleviate it. In the case of the Niger Delta, it is the oppressed that is preying on the oppressor through kidnaps and vandalization, yet the problem is not resolved. The militants in the Niger Delta should rather embark on a non-violent campaign which is capable of winning the support of the observing international community. This in itself will pave way for a better negotiation with the government and the



multinational oil companies that will eventually lead to a lasting solution to the crisis.

In the case of Myanmar, it appears that the nonviolent movement has shifted towards a constructive resistance, that in this case, unfortunately, is not a nonviolent one but is rather pushing Myanmar towards what is looking like a new civil war. Lebanon, on the other hand, has had the least favorable outcomes. However, at the time of writing, Lebanon just held an election, which has surprisingly pushed Hezbollah to the backseat. However, sectarianism is still strong and the elections have not changed the political system that the Lebanese people have been demanding, which might be impossible as long as geopolitics has such a stronghold in Lebanon.

References

- [1]. African Writers Abroad (1995). *Dance the Gun to Silence: 100 Poems for Saro-Wiwa*. US: Flipped Eye Publishing.
- [2]. Amodu, L. O. (2007). Niger Delta Crises and the Gandhi Philosophy of Conflict Resolution. *An African Journal of Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 9(2): 105-110.
- [3]. Awad, R., (2022). The power of non-violence: Silmiya & the Sudanese Revolution. *Conflict, Security & Development*, 22(1), pp.1-21.
- [4]. Bassil, N. & Zhang, J., (2021). The post-Bashir era in Sudan: tragedy or remedy?. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 75(3), pp.252-259.
- [5]. Castellote, M. (2022). What makes nonviolent resistance movements successful? Thesis of Linnaeus University.
- [6]. Chehayeb, K., (2021). *Cash-strapped Lebanon wakes up to countrywide roadblocks*. <<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/29/cash-strapped-lebanon-wakes-up-to-countrywide-roadblocks>> [Accessed 16 October 2022].
- [7]. Chehayeb, K., (2022). *Al Jazeera News|Today's latest from Al Jazeera*. <https://www.aljazeera.com/author/kareem_c_chehayeb_161030090223184> [Accessed 16 October 2022].
- [8]. Doyle, P. (2016). *Lebanon*. [S.l.]: Bradt Pubns.
- [9]. Gregg, R. (1934). *The power of nonviolence*.
- [10]. Grewal, S., (2021). Why Sudan Succeeded Where Algeria Failed. *Journal of Democracy*, 32(4), pp.102-114.
- [11]. Halabi, F. 2(019). *From "Overthrowing the Regime" to "All Means All": An Analysis of the Lebanonisation of Arab Spring Rhetoric*. <<https://www.arab-reform.net/publication/from-overthrowing-the-regime-to-all-means-all-an-analysis-of-the-lebanonisation-of-arab-spring-rhetoric/>>
- [12]. Hasan, Y. (1967). The Sudanese Revolution of October 1964. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 5(4), pp.491-509.
- [13]. Khair, K. (2022). *Sudan's coup is on shaky ground*. <<https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/11/19/sudans-coup-is-already-on-shaky-ground>> [Accessed 9 April 2022].
- [14]. Kurtulus, E. (2009). 'The Cedar Revolution': Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 36(2), pp.195-214.
- [15]. Kurtulus, E. (2009). 'The Cedar Revolution': Lebanese Independence and the Question of Collective Self-Determination. *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 36(2), pp.195-214.
- [16]. Mahaseth, H. & Tulsyan, A., (2022). The Myanmar Coup and the Role of Asean. *SSRN Electronic Journal*.
- [17]. Maizland, L., (2022). *Myanmar's Troubled History: Coups, Military Rule, and Ethnic Conflict*. <<https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/myanmar-history-coup-military-rule-ethnic-conflict-rohingya>> [Accessed 16 October 2022].
- [18]. Pollard, G. (2015). *Burma/Myanmar's nonviolent movement failures: why resilience and leverage matter*. <<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1009196.pdf>> [Accessed 17 October 2022].
- [19]. Rizkallah, A. (2017). The paradox of power-sharing: stability and fragility in postwar Lebanon. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40(12), pp.2058-2076.
- [20]. Salih, K., (1990). The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28(2), pp.199-224.
- [21]. Selth, A. (2008). Burma's 'saffron revolution' and the limits of international influence. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 62(3), pp.281-297.
- [22]. Sharp, G. (1973). *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, 902 pp. Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher. [A seminal work on nonviolent politics, written in three volumes, it remains



- today the starting point of scholarship on nonviolence].
- [23]. Sharp, G. (2005). *Waging nonviolent struggle: 20th century practice and 21st century potential*. Boston: Extending Horizons Books.
- [24]. Sutton, R. (2014). *Lebanon's Arab Spring: The Cedar Revolution Nine Years On*. <https://archive.transatlanticrelations.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/paradigm_chapter8.pdf>