



India, Pakistan and BRICS after the 2024 Kazan summit.

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What BRICS is is still a subject of theoretical discussion. It was created as an informal agreement between Russia, China, India and Brazil, which was joined by South Africa. The creator of the name of this group, which is an acronym for its founders, was Jim O'Neil, chief economist at Goldman-Sachs, former Secretary of the Treasury of the United Kingdom, to describe the form of cooperation between developing countries, which should strengthen cooperation in an alternative to the wider Western world. The term invented by the "global banker" was accepted and became used by the countries concerned. Cooperation between the various members of this informal group has gradually taken the form of annual leaders' meetings, which take place in rotation in successive countries. To date, this group has not taken the shape of a formal international organization with specific decision-making procedures. Similarly, rotational is the leadership of the group. The group itself does not provide information about what it actually is. Information on this subject has disappeared from its official portal. Therefore, one can only try to classify this group on the basis of its activity¹. And here, taking into account the cyclical nature of the meetings, the creation of working groups, the invitation of countries as new members and to partnership, it can already be assumed that we are dealing with an international organization *shahedinstatunascendi*. The example of Pakistan, analysed in the following part of the article, indicates that it is an organisation with a semi-open membership character, as it has developed a practice that all current members decide on the admission of new countries to the ranks of members or on granting them the status of a partner state. In other words, each Member State has a veto in this matter. Similarly, documents in the form of conclusions from individual meetings of the Heads of State or Government are adopted by consensus. The emerging concepts concerning, in particular, the introduction of the common currency, and at the

moment setting the rules of trade based on national currencies (most of which are not recognized by the global financial system as convertible) may indicate that the BRICS has some integration ambitions. On the other hand, the principles of respect for sovereignty and the principles of peaceful coexistence are emphasized in the documents, which excludes in the foreseeable future a situation in which the BRICS will go in a similar direction as the European Union is currently in. The functioning of countries in this group of countries that are at the forefront of world economies in terms of economic development, such as China and India, cannot in any way be called a "club of the poor" in opposition to, for example, the G7, considered a "club of the rich". On the other hand, the BRICS presents itself as an alternative to the so-called "rich North", representing the interests of the "poor South", whatever that means. The BRICS projects to introduce a common settlement currency, a common investment bank and an alternative to the SWIFT system allow us to put forward a thesis that the goal of BRICS is to create a new financial system, which will only be independent of the one currently created by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, and based on the primacy of the US dollar. A heuristic analysis of a similar process in the Western world leads to the conclusion that the BRICS will be institutionalized, but its pace and direction are difficult to predict.

The period of the SARS Covid-19 pandemic has disrupted existing supply chains. The environmental policy pursued by the European Union, which is associated with draconian reductions in CO2 emissions, has accelerated the process of moving industrial production from the West to the East. Russia's war against Ukraine and the imposition of an economic embargo on Moscow by the EU and the US have created conditions (and for Russia a necessity) for the search for new forms of cooperation between countries that have so far remained on the margins of the existing, "Western" economic system, which has accelerated the consolidation processes within the BRICS, making this group a forum where Russia and its leaders can

¹<https://infobrics.org/> 28.10.2024



appear as equals and implement forms of cooperation on slightly modified terms, but still bypassing the Western embargo. For countries such as China and India, on the other hand, the new situation has given them the opportunity to purchase strategic raw materials from Russia at competitive prices compared to market prices, bypassing the US dollar, often either for their own currency or on the basis of barter². Z natury rzeczy czynnikiem łączącym poszczególne państwa grupy BRICS są zatem kwestie gospodarcze, ale także na poziomie ideowym – odrzucenie neokolonializmu a także dominującej roli USA w świecie, a szerzej – dominującej roli świata zachodniego. W odróżnieniu od Ruchu Państw Niezaangażowanych z lat 70 i 80 minionego wieku, dziś państwa tworzące BRICS posiadają siłę gospodarczą umożliwiającą dużo większą niezależność gospodarczą od kapitału zachodniego.

However, we must not forget about the serious differences between individual BRICS countries. They are particularly visible in Indian-Chinese relations. From political issues (democracy in India vs. authoritarianism in China), border conflict (which has been escalating in recent years) to economic issues, in many respects the economies of these countries are competitive with each other³. Also when it comes to the long-term goals of foreign policy, one can notice symptoms of the escalation of the conflict, which is expressed, for example, in a kind of naval arms race, and to some extent also nuclear arms (although India points to Pakistan, which remains a close ally of China, as the main enemy)⁴. This, in turn, has an impact on the relations of these countries with third countries, especially India's relations with the U.S. and its allies. Also, despite the economic interdependence between Russia and China (China needs Russian raw materials, and Russia needs Chinese products), there is still a serious conflict when it comes to the division of influence in the post-Soviet area of Central Asia.

One of the steps on the long road to the transformation of the BRICS into a supra-regional international organization and/or to the creation of

an alternative economic system to the West was and is the admission of more member states to the group⁵.

The first such event took place in 2011, when South Africa joined, but the most significant was the accession of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates in January 2024. The possibility of expanding the group to include more members after the Kazan summit in 2024 has led to a serious dispute between India on the one hand, and China and Russia on the other. This problem will be considered later in the article.

Theoretical considerations.

In order to understand the axis of the dispute between India and China over the admission of Pakistan and Turkey to the BRIC, it is necessary to refer to theoretical considerations. We are dealing with one of two possible approaches to the question of the role of international organizations in world diplomacy: realistic and liberal (also called idealistic). Realism, as one of the dominant theories of international relations, is the foundation for the analysis of the dynamics of the actions of states and international institutions. According to a realistic approach, international organizations are seen mainly as tools serving the interests of the countries that establish them and in which they operate.

Realism assumes that in international relations, power and national interest play a dominant role. Theorists such as Hans Morgenthau emphasize the fact that states are the main actors on the international stage, and their actions are aimed at maximizing their own interests⁶. From this perspective, international organizations are seen not as independent actors, but as platforms that enable states to coordinate actions to achieve specific policy goals. In a realistic sense, international organizations play an important role in facilitating cooperation, but their functionality is limited by the actual efforts of states to increase their own power. For example, in the context of the United Nations, realist theorists note that decisions made by the General Assembly or the Security Council reflect the balance of power between the major powers⁷. As a result, UN action can be ineffective in situations where national interests are not compatible. It

²<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2024/10/02/russia-to-accept-mandarins-instead-of-money-amid-payment-difficulties-a86543> 28.10.2024

³<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/10/22/how-india-and-china-pulled-back-from-a-border-war-and-why> 28.10.2024

⁴<https://www.economist.com/asia/2022/08/11/the-nuclear-arsenals-of-china-india-and-pakistan-are-growing> 28.10.2024

⁵<https://www.bing.com/search?q=brics+enlargement&q=UT&pq=brics+en&sc=10-8&cvid=2A8D301F934F420692127E0576391626&FORM=QBRE&sp=1&ghc=1&lq=0> 28.10.2024

⁶Morgenthau, H. J. *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*. New York 1948

⁷Waltz, K. *Theory of International Politics*. Reading, MA 1979



should be noted, however, that international organisations can also play a coordinating role in situations where states see the benefits of cooperation. For example, climate change treaties such as the Paris Agreement are sometimes seen as platforms that enable coordination between countries in the face of global challenges⁸. Nevertheless, the realistic theory emphasizes that such coordination is possible only if it does not threaten fundamental national interests. Critics of this approach point out that the aging dogmas of the realist are unable to take into account the growing importance of other actors, such as non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations or multilateral institutions, which also have an impact on shaping international politics⁹. Moreover, in the era of globalization, problems such as climate change or terrorism force countries to act beyond the traditional framework of national interest.

In contrast to realist theories, which focus on the anarchic structure of the international system and rivalry between states, the liberal approach largely emphasizes the importance of cooperation, institutions, and collective action mechanisms in resolving conflicts and promoting peace. In the context of international organizations, liberalism provides tools for analyzing their role and importance in the international system. Liberalism is based on several fundamental assumptions. First of all, it recognizes that states are not the only actors in the international system; other actors, such as international organisations, NGOs, as well as social and economic actors, play a key role in shaping international reality¹⁰. The second important assumption is the belief in the possibility of cooperation between countries and that this cooperation is beneficial for all entities involved. Finally, liberalism emphasizes the importance of international institutions and legislation that can support stability and international order by regulating interactions between states. The primary contribution of liberal theories to the analysis of international organizations is their perception as institutions that are supposed to reduce the uncertainty and transaction costs associated with

international interactions¹¹. International organizations, such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO), perform functions that facilitate cooperation by creating norms, rules, and procedures that govern the behavior of states and other actors¹². In this way, international organizations become platforms for negotiation, mediation and dispute resolution, which is conducive to maintaining peace and stability in international relations. Within liberalism, there is a current called institutionalism, which specifically focuses on the role of international institutions in promoting cooperation. According to this theory, international organizations not only enable diplomatic interactions, but also influence the preferences and behavior of states, leading to more predictable and stable relations¹³. Institutions such as NATO and ASEAN, operating within the framework of common principles and values, in practice reduce security concerns, thus promoting stabilizing mechanisms of cooperation¹⁴. Despite the numerous advantages of the liberal approach, it is not free from criticism. Some critics note that international institutions can be dominated by the most powerful states, leading to inequality and injustice in their functioning¹⁵. Moreover, some conflicts may be too complex to be resolved through an institutional framework alone, which raises the question of the effectiveness of international organizations in the face of the political dominance of great powers.

When studying the conflict between Pakistan and India, we naturally reach for realistic theories. In the context of the veto of Pakistan's accession to the BRICS, India argues that Islamabad supports separatism (Islamic terrorism) in the

⁸Stiglitz, J. E. *The Great Divide: Unequal Societies and What We Can Do About Them*. New York 2015

⁹Rosenau, J. N. *Distant Proximities: Dynamics beyond Globalization*. Princeton, NJ 1990

¹⁰Keohane, R. O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton 1984

¹¹Moravcsik, A. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A liberal Theory of International Politics". *International Organization*, 51(4) 1997, p.p. 513-553

¹²Ruggie, J. G. "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge". *International Organization*, 52(4) 1998, p.p. 855-885

¹³Axelrod, R., & Keohane, R. O. "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions". In: "Cooperation under Anarchy", ed. David A. Baldwin, Columbia 1985 p.p. 30-61.

¹⁴Adler, E., & Barnett, M. "Control and Trust in International Relations". In: "Security Communities", eds. Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Cambridge 1988 p.p. 24-25.

¹⁵Mearsheimer, J. J. "The False Promise of International Institutions". *International Security*, 19(3) 1995, p.p. 5-49.



former principality of Jammu and Kashmir, which it considers an integral part of its territory. The fight against international terrorism is one of the goals of BRICS cooperation. Realist theories perfectly explain this position: India is trying to eliminate a situation in which it would be forced to cooperate within one organization with a country that it considers a threat. However, it should not be forgotten that in 2017 both of these countries were accepted as members of a regional international organization: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (which also includes, m.in. China and Russia), which among its goals and tasks lists cooperation in the field of security, of which the fight against international terrorism is a key element. So what were Pakistan's goals when it joined the BRICS¹⁶? This act can be seen in a broader context: the will to institutionalize its regional cooperation at the international level. First of all, with the People's Republic of China (with which Islamabad has had very close relations since the very establishment of the PRC), but also with the Russian Federation (the establishment of this cooperation and its intensification can be observed on various levels since 2022)¹⁷. Pakistan is in a tragic situation in terms of financial issues (problems with maintaining financial liquidity, especially when it comes to foreign exchange reserves and access to loans, related to the very tough policy of the US and institutions controlled by it, such as the IMF and the World Bank), as well as energy (the rapid economic growth that has been observed over the last 20 years is one of the reasons for the growing demand for energy, in particular electricity, which Pakistan is not able to meet on its own, especially taking into account the need to import natural gas and oil, the prices of which on world markets have increased significantly in recent years)¹⁸. This situation has necessitated significant budget cuts, especially in the military sector¹⁹. It

would seem obvious that India is therefore interested in ensuring that its largest regional opponent remains in such a situation for as long as possible. Nota bene, it has improved somewhat due to the Russian-Ukrainian war, because due to the embargo from the US and the EU, Russia was forced to significantly reduce the prices of natural gas exported, m.in. to Pakistan, and in the future also oil, and to agree to the introduction of settlements in local currencies, as well as barter, which is beneficial for Islamabad in the reality of having small foreign exchange resources²⁰. However, such an arrangement will probably only last as long as the war in Ukraine continues. Its completion will ensure Russia's return to world markets, and thus to traditional forms of international trade. However, the potential deepening of the economic crisis in Pakistan poses a serious threat to international security, at least in the regional and possibly supra-regional dimension²¹. The plunge of Pakistan into a state of collapse (i.e. the loss of the possibility of effective control and maintenance of order and public security in the internal dimension, and the inability to meet the elementary needs of citizens) will naturally threaten the "spillover" of chaos to its neighbors, including the richer India²². It should be remembered that Pakistan is a multi-ethnic country and the natural result of the collapse of the central government will be the escalation of separatist movements. India is also similarly multi-ethnic, and the creation of several new states on the ruins of Pakistan may activate separatist movements and centrifugal forces in India itself. We should also consider what will happen to the resources of the Pakistani army (numbering over 500,000 people) and especially to Pakistan's nuclear arsenal (numbering over 100 nuclear warheads) in the event of the collapse of the central government. In such a case, the vision typical of realists of increasing one's own power by breaking up the state, considered a threat, in fact turns out to be the replacement of one threat with

¹⁶<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1240978-what-has-pakistan-gained-so-far-after-becoming-sco-member> 28.10.2024

¹⁷<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2023/10/01/why-brics-matters-for-pakistan/> 28.10.2024

¹⁸<https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/pakistans-power-crisis-a-perfect-storm-of-policy-failures/> 28.10.2024

¹⁹<https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2022/07/08/pakistan-slashes-military-modernization-fund-by-20/#:~:text=ISLAMABAD%20E2%80%94%20Pakistan%20E2%80%99s%20military%20modernization%20it%20taking%20a,%24346%20million%29%2>

²⁰<https://propakistani.pk/2024/10/02/pakistan-signs-first-ever-barter-trade-deal-with-russia/> 28.10.2024

²¹<https://www.bing.com/search?q=pakistan+fallen+state+thread&qsn&form=QBRE&sp=1&ghc=1&lq=0&pp=pakistan+fallen+state+thread&sc=9-28&sk=&cvid=06C9F436EFD74A8DBF620F80405478A5&ghsh=0&ghacc=0&ghpl=28.10.2024>

²²<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-65462347> 28.10.2024



another. An example is Pakistan's desire to weaken or overthrow any government in Afghanistan that Islamabad would consider pro-Indian²³. This happened both during the war with the Soviet intervention in the 1980s and in connection with the Taliban's war against the Republican government installed by the United States. In each of these cases, the chaos that arose in Afghanistan became a direct or indirect threat to Pakistan: it was a base for action for Islamist groups, and contributed to the increase in organized crime (related to drug smuggling, arms trafficking and human trafficking). It can be assumed with a high degree of probability that a similar threat to India would be the collapse of the state of Pakistan. Moreover, the possibility of a non-state actor seizing Pakistan's nuclear arsenal could threaten not only the security of India, but of virtually any state that such a terrorist group would consider a target of its activities²⁴. Taking into account these circumstances, the official arguments raised by India against Pakistan's accession to the BRICS should therefore be considered erroneous and even potentially dangerous for the security of India and even countries outside the South Asian region. On the other hand, adopting a liberal view, it can be assumed that the inclusion of Pakistan in the institutional forms of cooperation that are emerging within the BRICS may serve the creation of a network of connections (primarily at the economic level) that will make the escalation of the conflict between India and Pakistan unprofitable for the political and economic elites ruling in both countries. An example of this is the potential construction of a network of pipelines for the transport of natural gas and oil, as well as electricity and energy networks connecting individual South Asian countries, the potential destruction of which in the event of hostilities would lead to an economic catastrophe of the state, which would lead to a conflict²⁵. Such initiatives are beyond the financial capacity of individual countries, especially countries poorer than China today.

The notion that Pakistan's integration into the BRICS system is in India's long-term interest is apparently disputed by the government in New Delhi. What could be the reason for this? Apparently, we are dealing with an escalation of conflict within the BRICS between its largest

members: India and China. It results from a number of factors, which the formula of this article does not allow for an exhaustive analysis. One thing should be focused on here, namely the conflict for leadership both in the BRICS itself and among the developing countries currently remaining outside this structure (the countries of the "poor South"). India has both a long tradition in this regard, dating back to the Non-Aligned Movement, and clearly presented ambitions²⁶. China, since becoming one of the two strongest economies in the world, has also been trying to appear on the international arena as a supporter of multipolarity and a representative of countries that oppose the hegemony of the West (i.e. the United States)²⁷. The difference between these two positions and the powers representing them is not exclusively or primarily a "dispute over leadership", but also (and perhaps primarily) it is a dispute about how those countries that are in the BRICS or will decide to cooperate with it in the future will position themselves in global politics. The Chinese leadership means taking a course towards an increasingly less hidden confrontation with the United States (and more broadly: with the West), which may be limited to the economic dimension, but may also take on a military dimension. A symbol of this approach in the future may be the attitude towards possible attempts to join Taiwan by force to the People's Republic of China. The Indian leadership, on the other hand, will most likely refer to the tradition of the Non-Aligned Movement, i.e. the desire to maintain an equal distance from the most important antagonists in the growing conflict with the West in order to use the conflict to its own advantage. The experience of Russia's current aggression against Ukraine also shows, albeit slightly, a slight but crack in its stance on the Kremlin's policy: India has officially maintained a neutral stance towards the conflict, expressing it by abstaining from voting on sanctions against Russia at the UN. Another BRICS member, Iran, is actively providing military assistance to the Russian side (for example, by supplying Shahed combat drones)²⁸. Although China is trying to avoid taking an unequivocal position at the UN, by buying raw materials from Russia and not preventing Iran and North Korea from supporting the Kremlin, it is de

²³<https://www.cfr.org/article/pakistans-support-taliban-what-know> 28.10.2024

²⁴<https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-agonizing-problem-of-pakistans-nukes/> 28.10.2024

²⁵<https://thediplomat.com/2024/04/iran-and-pakistans-peace-pipeline-conundrum/> 28.10.2024

²⁶<https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/12/world/asia/india-china-global-south.html> 28.10.2024

²⁷<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00131857.2022.2151896> 28.10.2024

²⁸<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-62225830> 29.10.24



facto on the side of the Kremlin. From this perspective, i.e. the conflict over the leadership of the BRICS and the vision of the direction of the evolution of this system, the difference in positions between China and India on the issue of admitting Pakistan and Turkey to the group should also be assessed. Beijing, together with Moscow, officially declared their support for the new candidates. India, on the other hand, expressed its strong opposition, which resulted in the formal failure to consider this issue during the Kazan summit, which de facto means postponing the issue of enlargement of the group for an indefinite future²⁹.

Another dimension in which the BRICS conflict has emerged is the failure to implement two important demands with which Russia sat at the negotiating table: the creation of its own settlement system as an alternative to SWIFT and the creation of a common currency alternative to the US dollar³⁰. In the first case, it was China that considered this idea "premature", although it considers it appropriate to act in this direction³¹. The departure from the dollar was vetoed by India at this stage³².

This means that although the Kremlin can count on limited but still support from BRICS partners for military and political actions in Ukraine, in the economic dimension, its two largest partners do not intend to do anything that would help Russia get out of international isolation completely. Therefore, we are dealing here with this kind of action that serves to build the international power of China and India at the expense of Russia, but without strengthening the West at the same time. In addition, New Delhi is trying to pursue a moderate policy which, on the one hand, will not lead to an immediate collapse of Russia's international position, but on the other hand, cannot be perceived as confrontational by both China and the U.S.

Summary.

The summit in Kazan was supposed to be a demonstration of the power of Russian diplomacy.

²⁹<https://swarajyamag.com/news-brief/pakistans-brics-membership-hopes-dashed-as-india-pushed-for-consensus-in-expansion-of-bloc> 28.10.2024

³⁰<https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-brics-summit-china-india-d672be9b1ec2ffd0fba608e8a6aca790> 28.10.2024

³¹<https://apnews.com/article/russia-putin-brics-summit-china-india-d672be9b1ec2ffd0fba608e8a6aca790> 28.10.2024

³²<https://www.reuters.com/world/brics-is-fairies-until-china-india-get-serious-mr-brics-says-2024-10-23/> 28.10.2024

However, in this respect, it turned out to be a moderate defeat for Vladimir Putin, who, apart from demonstrating that his country is not effectively isolated in the international arena, did not achieve great international success. On the other hand, a clear increase in the international position of China and India could be observed at the expense of the Russian Federation, which showed effectiveness both in implementing their important demands and the ability to equally effectively block demands that they considered harmful to themselves. Both Beijing and New Delhi have once again demonstrated an important trait characteristic of their political culture: patience. At the summit in Kazan, no decisions were made that could be perceived as unequivocally anti-Western in the current international situation. Such could be considered the creation of an alternative settlement system and the announcement of the acceleration of work on the introduction of a common (probably gold-based) currency, alternative to the US dollar. At the same time, however, the admission of new members and the declaration that the BRICS remains open to further enlargements is a clear signal to the West that the process of creating an organism (perhaps in the future also an institution) that brings together developing countries is a fact. Such a patient policy is also an expression of a kind of reason: violent movements would certainly have a major impact on the election campaign in the United States, which is not in the interest of the main BRICS members at this stage. The specificity of the BRICS meant that the most controversial topics were not included in the official agenda, as well as the previously described admission of Pakistan and Turkey to the group. The lack of a formal vote on these issues allows those countries and their leaders who wanted to carry them out formally to come out on top. For an outside observer, it is still unclear whether the BRICS will move towards institutionalization or whether it will remain only a "platform for cooperation" in the near future. However, the deep differences of interests between the main "shareholders" of this project: India and China are becoming more and more visible. There is also a clear decline in Russia's importance as a power capable of imposing its will on countries with equal or higher potential, especially economic potential. Its position, despite its status as host and chairman of the Kazan summit, has in fact been reduced to the role of a petitioner who has received very moderate support for the policy pursued towards Ukraine and the West, but without any clear economic support that would give it a greater margin of independence. On the contrary, a picture has emerged in which



Russia is increasingly becoming dependent on both China and India, which allows us to predict that regardless of the development of military events in Ukraine, their political and military beneficiaries will be Beijing and New Delhi.

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