



Impact Of Boko-Haram Insurgency on Food Security in Northeast, Nigeria

EFFIONG Okon Ekpo, MOHAMMED Ayuba Oche &, SANUSI Abubakar

Institute of Governance & Development Studies^{1,3}, Nasarawa State University, Keffi, Department of Sociology, Federal University Lafia, Nasarawa State²

Date of Submission: 04-02-2026

Date of Acceptance: 15-02-2026

Abstract

The emergence Boko Haram Insurgency in 2002, marked the beginning of the current trends of terrorism in Northeast Nigeria, and this has affected the livelihood of the inhabitants of the area negatively, as the people who are predominantly farmers can no longer access their farmland. The objective of this study is to examine the trends of attacks by Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on food security in Northeast Nigeria, with focus on various operational tactics used by the Terrorists in Northeast Nigeria, and its impact on food security in area. Human Security Theory was used as security framework to provide lucid explanation to the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in Northeast region. Descriptive research method was used for the study, while Primary and secondary data were collected through field visitation, in-depth interview of critical stakeholders, and desk review of archival materials. 400 participants were involved in the study. Frequency table, simple percentage, Statistical Package for Social Sciences were used in analyzing the data gotten from the participants, and the result revealed that the activities of Boko Haram insurgency were 80% responsible for food insecurity in Northeast Nigeria. Based on major findings made as a result of useful data deduced from the opinion of critical stake holders, the study concludes that insurgency has festered in the Northeast region for over a decade, and this has resulted serious humanitarian crisis in the area. Premised on the data provided by participants, the study made far reaching recommendations on how Boko Haram insurgency can be addressed, and how agricultural activities can be revitalized, with the view to addressing food insecurity in Northeast Nigeria in particular, and Nigeria in general.

Key words: Boko Haram, Insurgency, Food Security.

I. Introduction

Insurgency is a global threat that has proliferated almost all the regions around the globe. From the economically advanced nations in Europe, America, Asia and Latin America. The situation is not different in Africa and Nigeria in particular. Insurgency in Nigeria started with the emergence of “Maitatsine” religious sect in the early 1980s the military government in power was able to quashed the group from the bud. However, the current trend of insurgency in Northeast Nigeria started in 2002, when Mohammed Yusuf established a religious sect known as “Jama’ atul Al-Sunnah Lidda’ awati wal Jihad” aka “Boko Haram” (Mohammed, 2010); translated as “People committed to the reaching and practice of the Prophet and Jihad” (Omede & Omede, 2015). Mehari (2016) notes that since its establishment, Boko Haram, the group has remained a threat to not just the Northeast region, but Nigeria in general.

Conspicuously, the Nigeria’s Northeast Region comprised six states of the federation namely; Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, Taraba, Gombe and Bauchi States (Abubakar, 1977). Based on 2006 National population report, the region has an estimated population projection of 22,558,674, representing about 12% of Nigeria’s population. A recent survey by the Bureau of Statistics (2023) indicated that Northeast region constitute about one third of the total land mass of Nigeria, spanning 20,121 square kilometer (7,773 square miles). The people of Northeast region are predominantly farmers (Cadre Harmonise, 2017). Since its emergence, Boko Haram Terrorists (BHTs) has conducted several violent attacks on security agents and the civilian population in Northeastern Nigeria and beyond.

Ibrahim and Hauna, 2016 maintain that the group had existed in Kanamma, Yobe State since 1995, and led by Mohammad Ali. The group practice Dara Islam, and referred to themselves as “Nigerian Taliban.” As a result of clash with security agencies in December 2003, Mohammad Ali was killed. Following the dead of Mohammad Ali his followers



fled Kanamma in Yunusari Local Government of Yobe State and married up with Mohammed Yusuf in January 2004. Consequently, Mohammed Yusuf established his own Mosque known as Ibn Tiamyya Masjid Mosque at Gwange Ward (Railway area) in Maiduguri. Mohammed Yusuf moved with his followers who were predominantly illiterate youth who were poor, unemployed, and school dropped-out to his new Mosque (Ekhomu, 2020).

While giving the background Boko Haram and the current trends of terrorism in Northeast Nigeria, Agbiboa (2014) traced the root cause of militancy in Northern Nigeria to the 19th century, when Sheik Usman Dan Fodio (1759 – 1817), initiated a holy war against the Hausa elites, who were traditional worshippers. This resulted in the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate which was administered in accordance with strict sharia law. This was later replicated in the entire Northern region. In 1903 the Caliphate raised a group known as “Mahdi” who fought against British colonial forces. The Mahdi was defeated, and the caliphate fell under colonial rule. Notwithstanding the colonial rule, Islam became the legitimate faith of the majority of Northerners (Mohammed, 2010). The goal of Boko Haram Insurgents is to create an Islamic State in Nigeria to replace the current circular system, this explains the group’s violent behavior towards achieving their objectives (Ibaba, 2013). While presents a complicated case, the has investigated the impact of Boko-Haram insurgency on food security in Northeast region of Nigeria.

1.2 Statement of the problem

Over the years, the Nigerian state has been ravaged by violent crimes, ranging from insurgency, terrorism, banditry, cattle rustling, illegal oil bunkering, cultism, to mention but few. Unfortunately, none of the six geo-political zones is immune from the scourge of insecurity. Therefore, the security agencies have been stretched to its limit. Among the six geo-political zones of Nigeria, Northeast is the most devastated due to the activities of Boko Haram (Khan & Cheri, 2016). Records have shown that Northeast Nigeria is the poorest and most disturbed region in the country. Based on National Bureau of Statistics report, Northeast region was the second poorest region in the country, with 77.3% poverty index, next to North-west with 77.7% (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS] Report, 2012). However, Khan and Cheri (2016) have suggested that Northeast region is the poorest region in Nigeria with 77.7% poverty rate, and a rising social deprivation including food insecurity.

Consequently, the insurgency attacks on farming communities in Yobe has denied residents of Gujba access, utilization, and made food expensive beyond the reach of those in need of nutrition. Aiyedogbon (2012) notes that, unemployment and inability of the people to access their farmland for agricultural activities has played a role in the escalation of violence in Northeast Nigeria. Over the years scholars have focused on the causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria, rather than perception and experience of the people of the region who suffers hunger, and other economic and social deprivation due to the activities of the Insurgents. Also, most study have not looked at the problem of Boko Haram insurgency through the theoretical lens of the pillars of human security. Therefore, it is in view of the foregoing that this study has examined the impact of the Boko-Haram insurgency on food security in Northeast particularly Gujba Local Government Area of Yobe State, Nigeria.

1.3 Research Objectives

The main objective is to investigate the impact of Boko-Haram insurgency on food security in Northeast, Nigeria. The specific objectives include:

- i. To examine the trends of attacks by Boko Haram insurgents’ attacks in Gujba LGA of Yobe State.
- ii. Examine how the activities of Boko Haram insurgents caused food insecurity in Gujba LGA of Yobe State.

1.4 Methodology

This study adopted survey research design. Gujba LGA of Yobe State has 130,088 people. The purposive sampling technique was used to collect 400 eligible respondents, aged 18 years and above, using Taro Yamane Statistical (1967). Primary and secondary data were collected through for the study, questionnaire instrument based on 5-point Likert Scale was used for data collection. Data collected were analysed using descriptive statistics.

2.1 Theoretical Framework: Human Security Theory

Human security theory offers explanation to the need to divert emphasis of security from National to personal security. The idea was first articulated by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, chaired by a Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme, popularly known as; Palme Commission (1982). The main focus of Human security theory is to offer a causal understanding of human condition. In other word, the theory looks hypothetically at the



relationship between causes and effects of conflict, as well as policy measures that should work in real life. According to UNDP report human security is premised on five fundamental principles, namely; People-centered approach, Comprehensive approach, Context-specific approach, Prevention oriented approach, and Protection and empowerment approach. The primary concern of the theory is to guarantee peoples' livelihoods through social security. It also considers context-specific measures that would prevent a broad range of conditions that threatens the survival, dignity and livelihood of people and their community. The theory operates under seven pillars, namely, Economic security, Food security, Health security, Environmental security, and Personal security others are Community security, and Political security. Applicability/Relevance of the theory to the study. The theory is relevant to this study, in the sense that it serves as a framework to examine at the relationship between causes and effects of terrorism, and assessment of the impact of terrorism on the people in Northeast Nigeria. Although, the human security theory was critiqued for being vague, and that its vagueness undermines its effectiveness, and makes it a mere vehicle for activist who wish to promote certain causes. In spite that above criticisms, the theory is adequate in the explanation of the subject matter and therefore, can government to take action in addressing security concerns in the affected areas.

Boko Haram

Boko Haram is a terrorist group in Northeast Nigeria, known for unleashing terror on Nigerians while pursuing the idea of turning the country into an Islamic State (Kanta, Azadi & Scheffran, 2020). The phrase "Boko Haram" is a combination of Hausa and Arabic words; "Boko" is a Hausa word translated as "Western education", while Haram is an Arabic word translated "as sin or forbidden". Literally, "Boko Haram means western education is a sin (or) forbidden". In Hausa language, "Boko" is a corruption of the word "book". This word is used in many contexts, but to the average Hausa Muslim, "Boko" represents Western Education. Thus, when a Hausa person mention "Makaranta Boko", he or she is referring to Western School which is quite different from "Makaranta Islamiyya" which means Islamic

School (Ekhomu, 2020). However, this study conceived insurgency as a group that use threats and violence to achieve its goals. Therefore, Boko-Haram is a rebellious group that uses terror to attain their goals.

Concept of Insurgency

Insurgency is sometimes used interchangeably with terms such as terrorism. However, some scholars are of the opinion that insurgency is broader in scope than terrorism (Khalil & Zauthen, 2014). The United State Central Intelligence Agency (USCIA) (2002), conceived insurgency as "a protracted political-military activities directed towards completely or partially controlling the resources of a country, through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations". While Insurgency seeks to bring about political change within a system. On the other hand, terrorism is defined as the use of threat of extreme violence to instill fear on the people especially civilians in order to cause government to take certain policy decision (Odiadi, in Adamu, 2018). Terrorism on its own may not bring about political change, but can influence certain policy decisions. Regardless of the differences between the concepts, there is a consensus that they all pursue their goals using the instrumentality of fear and intimidation, rather than through peaceful means. Boko Haram can be described as an Insurgent group.

Food Security

Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), at the World Food Summit known as, Rome Declaration (1996), defines Food Security as "when all people at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe, and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preference for active and healthy life" (FAO, 2022). From this definition, it is obvious that the concept of food security is not limited to the ability to afford food for daily consumption, but it also includes availability, affordability, and sustainability of nutritious and quality diet at all times. However, this study conceived food security as stability of adequate food supply in terms of quality and variety; optimize stability inflow of supplies and secure sustainable access to availability by those who need them.

Table 2.1 Tends and patterns of Terrorist attack between 2003 - 2022

/No	Date	At tacker	Mode of attack	Target and location	Effect
/2003	31/12	Nigerian Taliban/Bo	Guerrilla Tactics	Police stations in	Scores of Police officers were killed and



		ko Haram Terrorists (BHTs)		Kanamma and Geidam	the police armories were looted.
	2004	23/9/ HTs	B Guerrilla tactics	Gwoza and Bama towns, Borno State	6 persons were killed, including four police officers and two civilians.
	/2004	10/10 HTs	B Guerrilla Tactics	Police convoy near the town of Kala Balge, Borno State, on the Border with Chad	12 Police officers were killed in the attack and several weapons belonging to the police were stolen.
	2009	26/7/ HTs	B Guerrilla Tactics	Police stations and military facilities in Maiduguri, Borno State and Damaturu, Yobe State respectively.	Over 800 BHTs, were killed. Mohammed Yusuf was captures alive, Ibn Tiamyya Masjid Mosque which served as their headquarters was destroyed.
2	/2011	25/12 Na me of the suicide bomber not disclosed by the sect	VBIED (Type of vehicle not reported)	State Command Headquarters of the State Security Services (SSS) in Damaturu, Yobe State	The suicide bomber and 3 SSS operatives died, I person was injured, An Armoured Personnel Carrier was damaged
	2013	2/12/ mes of suicide bombers not disclosed by the sect	Na Armed Assault	Over 100 armed Boko Haram members attacked the Air Force base in Maiduguri	Three fighter jets, two helicopters, over fifty vehicles and over 40 persons were killed
	/2013	20/12 Na mes of suicide bombers not disclosed by the sect	Na Armed Assault	Over 150 armed Boko Haram members attacked and took over the military Barracks in Bama.	Over 45 persons were killed, while 50 blocks of flat and 75 vehicles were burnt while
	/2014	14/04 ko Haram Fighters	Bo Guerrilla Tactics	Government Girls Secondary School Chibok, Borno State	276 School Girls mostly Christians were abducted and food catered away



	31/12 /2014	Bo ko Haram Fighters	Armed Assault/VBIEDs	Yobe State Government House and Headquarters 27 Task Force Brigade, Damaturu.	Scores of people killed, several others wounded and properties destroyed.
	19/02 /2018	Bo ko Haram Terrorists (ISWAP Faction)	Guerrilla Tactics	Governme nt Girls' Science and Technical College (GGSTC) Dabchi, Bulabilin Bursri LGA of Yobe State	110 School Girls were abducted
0	12/06 /2018	Bo ko Haram Fighters (ISWAP faction)	Armed Assault	158 Battalion location at Karaeto, Mosba L.G.A, Borno State	Over 100 soldiers were killed including the Commanding Officer, while several weapons were catered away
1	25/07 /2018	Bo ko Haram Fighter (ISWAP faction)	Guerrilla attack on a convoy conveying Oil Experts	Maigumeri village, Maigumeri L.G.A, Borno State	69 persons were killed including 18 soldiers scores of Civilian JTF, Oil Experts. While 2 Lecturers from the Dept of Geology UNIMAID and a driver were abducted
2	18/11 /2018	Bo ko Haram Fighters (ISWAP faction)	Armed Assault/VBIEDs	157 Battalion location at Metele, Borno State	Over 100 soldiers were killed including the commanding officer and several weapons were catered way
3	02/12 /18	Bo ko Haram Terrorists (ISWAP faction)	Armed Assault	Military location in Buni Yadi, Gujba L.G.A, Yobe State	2 Soldiers were killed, while weapons were catered away
4	28/11 /2020	Bo ko Haram Terrorists (ISWAP Faction)	Guerrilla Tactics	Koshobe, near Zabarmari villages Jere LGA, Borno State	43 rice farmers were killed

Source: (Nwangwu & Ezeibe, 2019; Omani, 2018a; Moni, 2018b, Harnischfeger, 2015; Nossiter, 2011; Okolie & Lenshie, 2020).



2.2.2 Impact of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in Northeast Nigeria

Boko Haram insurgency has had dire consequence on the livelihood of people in Northeast Nigeria, especially the BAY States of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. These states are among the main food growing states in Nigeria. In fact, Northeast constitutes about one third of the total land mass of Nigeria. The people of the region are predominantly farmers, who specialized in crop farming, animal husbandry, and fishing. Prior to the advent of Boko Haram Terrorism, Northeast Nigeria was reputed to be the highest producer of certain agricultural produce such as; Cowpea, rice, millet, tomatoes, groundnut, beans, pepper, maize, sorghum, beef and dairy products (Olaolu, 2012).

The activities of Boko Haram Insurgents have forced farmers in Northeast Nigeria to flee their farmland for fear of being killed. For example, on 6 November, 2020 Boko Haram attacked and killed over 43 rice farmers in Koshebe near Zabarmari Village in Jere Local Government Area of Borno State. More recently, on 15 January, 2025, the insurgents attacked and killed 40 farmers in Kayakura Village, Doron Baga Ward, Kukawa Local Govern Area of Borno State. These and many other attacks have forced farmers to flee their local communities and abandon their farmlands for fear of being killed. Eme et al, (2014) argue that Boko Haram Terrorists have stopped the flow of beans. They further note that two food items namely; pepper and tomatoes in particular, which mostly come from the North are in short supply. This has resulted in increase in price of food. Osagie

(2013:24) suggest that if the rising food shortage which is caused by violent attacks by BHTs continues, the country could be plunged into a state of chronic food insecurity. This will put individuals at the risk of hunger, starvation, malnutrition, and even death. Malnutrition rate is high in areas worst hit by terrorism and conflict in general.

According to the Humanitarian Needs Overview (2014:12) "a SMART survey conducted by the Nigerian government and UNICEF in spring 2014, Global Acute Malnutrition was found to be 15.5% in Yobe State, and 13.6% in Borno State. Food and nutrition insecurity are the fundamental threats to human security in Northeast Nigeria. Thus, the need to curb terrorism in the area cannot be overemphasized. Studies have shown that an increase in conflict intensity, measured by number of fatalities have often resulted in the number of days households in Northeast Nigeria have to; (1) rely on less preferred food (2) limit the variety of food eaten and (3) limit the quantity and quality of food consumed. According to Cadre (2017) terrorism has caused acute food shortage in Northeast Nigeria in particular and Nigeria in general, this because farmer in the North can no longer access their farm. According to National Bureau of Statistics Report (2012) Northeast region is ranked second next to Northwest in terms of food poverty, absolute poverty, relative poverty and per capital poverty in terms of USD. Invariably, these two regions are the most devastated regions as a result of terrorism. Below is a table showing the poverty index across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria;

Table 2. Poverty Index in Nigeria (According to Geopolitical Zones)

Zone	Food poor	Absolutely poor	Relatively poor	Dollar per day poor
North-west	51.8%	70.0%	77.7%	70.4%
North-east	51.5%	69.0%	76.3%	69.1%
North-central	38.6%	59.5%	67.5%	59.7%
South-west	25.4%	49.8%	59.1%	50.1%
South-east	41.0%	58.7%	67.0%	59.2%
South-South	35.5%	55.9%	63.8%	56.1%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2012) "The bold row represents the rate of poverty in Northeast which is the context of this study."

4.1 Data Presentation and Analysis

Quantitative research method was used for this study. 400 participants provided useful insight in the study. Structured questionnaire, based on 5-point Likert options was administered to respondents, which ensures accuracy in the data obtained. Data was analyzed using frequency table, simple percentage and Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).

SPSS enable the researcher to manage, analyze and interpret the large dataset effectively. Through the use of various statistical techniques, this study identifies the impact of Boko Haram insurgency on food security in Northeast Nigeria. Insurgency was identified as independent variable, while food security was identified as dependent variable.

4.2 Major Findings



The use of regression analysis helps to identify the relationship between insurgency as independent variable and food security as dependent variable. Responses from respondents suggest a positive relationship between Boko Haram insurgency and food security in Northeast Nigeria. The study shows that, prior to the advent of insurgency in Northeast Nigeria, the region was the highest producer of certain food items such as; Rice, millet, tomatoes, groundnut, beans pepper, maize, sorghum, beef and dairy products. After the emergence of Boko Haram insurgency in the area, the insurgents have carried out several attacks resulting in the killing of several farmers. For example, the killing of farmers in Koshebe community, near Zabarmari, and Kayakura village in Doro Baga Ward, while others have been forced to flee from their farmland for fear of being killed are typical examples of the effects of the activities of the Insurgents in the region. This has affected agricultural production in the region is most residents now take refuge in displaced peoples' camps in the city centers within the country, and refugee camps in neighboring countries.

5.1 Conclusion/Recommendations

In conclusion, data from participants in this study revealed both perception and experience of frustration about the activities of Boko Haram insurgency in Northeast Nigeria. The people of Northern Nigeria, be it Northeast, Northwest or Northcentral, are predominantly farmers in crops, animal husbandry and fishing. However, since the advent of terrorism in Northern Nigeria, especially Northeast, farmers have been forced to abandon their farmlands in the rural areas and seek refuge in city centers. A greater percentage of the respondent believe that Boko Haram insurgency is responsible for the food insecurity that is being experience in Northeast Nigeria at the moment. The Koshebe attack in which over 43 rice farmers were killed in their farms and the Kayakura attack in which 40 farmers were also killed in their farmland are some of the reasons why farmers are afraid to return to their farms for fear of being killed by the Insurgents. This has resulted in high unemployment. Food security does not only constitute a conflict in itself, but it also has tendency to exacerbate other conflicts and create poverty.

Agricultural sector plays a pivotal role in both regional and national development as it creates employment for the youths and ensures food security for the people. However, terrorism has kept farmers in Northeast Nigeria out of their farmland, and this has resulted in acute food shortage in the. The food

shortage has affected both quality and quantity of food available to the people. Beef production, dairy products and fish production have also witnessed serious decline. The inability of the people to access beef, dairy products has exposed them to malnutrition and malnourishment. This has made the people, especially women and children susceptible to diseases. Food insecurity has also led to other crises such as; broken homes, unwanted pregnancies, out of school children, youth restiveness, and other social vices, due to parents' inability to provide for their families. Based on the study's findings, the following recommendations are made: Government at all level; federal, state, and local government levels should put measures in place to identify and address the root causes of insurgency in Northeast Nigeria in particular, and the country in general, and facilitate the return of both Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) and externally displaced persons (Refugees) to their ancestral homes. When this is achieved, the returned villagers should be provided with the necessary support, in terms of farm implement and seedling to commence farming in the next planting season. This will help to build the peoples' confidence in the ability of the government to secure them, and it will also eliminate food insecurity in Northeast Nigeria. It also, recommends that government at all levels should evolve strategies, in collaboration with critical partners including Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) through Ministry of Budget and Economic Planning, as well as Ministry of Agriculture to achieve the country's objective on food, nutrition and coordination of development plan in Northeast region and Nigeria in general. Government at all levels should strengthen collaboration with relevant stakeholders with regards to the issue of Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) to improve food security across the country. And governments at all levels should evolve measures to actualize some, if not all the 17 objectives of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), some of which includes End poverty, zero hunger, good health and well-being, clean water and sanitation, reduced inequality, responsible consumption and production patterns etc. If these goals are achieved, the issue of food insecurity would be addressed.

References

- [1]. Abimbola, J. O. & Adesote, S. A. (2012). Domestic Terrorism and Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria, Issues and Trends: Ahistorical Discourse, Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society Vol. 4. September 2012.



- [2]. Abiodun, T. F., Okpatoki, O. O., Adeyemo, D., & Obi, C. (2020). Assessment of Boko Haram Insurgency threats to Educational Development in the Northeast Nigeria: The way forward. *African Journal of Social Sciences and Humanity Reseach*, 3(1), 31 – 43.
- [3]. Abiodun, T. F., Ayo-Edeyekun, I., Onafowora, O. & Nwanenaya, C. (2018). Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and its Threats to Nigeria’s Internal Security. *International Journal of Social Science and Humanities Research*.
- [4]. Adetoro, R, A. (2012). Boko Haram in Nigeria as a symptom of poverty and political alienation. *Journal of Humanities and Social Science*, 3(5),doi:352126
- [5]. Adibe, J. (1914). “Explaining the Emergence of Boko Haram”, *Africa in focus*, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/05/06/explaining-the-emergence-of-boko-haram>(retrieved January 4, 2024)
- [6]. Agbiboa, D. E. (2013). The ongoing campaign of terror in Nigeria: Boko Haram versus the state. *International Journal of Society and Development*, 2(3), 1-52, doi:http://doi.org/10,5334/sta.cl.
- [7]. Aiyedogbon, J. O. & Ohwofasa, B. O. (2012). Poverty and Youth Unemployment in Nigeria. *Journal of Business and social Sciences. Special Issue*. 3(20), 269-279.
- [8]. Akanji, O. O. (2015). The security crisis in Nigeria: Boko Haram insurgency and the prospect for peace. *Conflict Studies Quarterly, Special Issue*, 2015, 58-73.
- [9]. Akinola, O. (2013). Nigeria trouble north: Interrogating the drivers of public support for Boko Haram. *International Center for Terrorism, Hague*, 4(7), 1-18.
- [10]. Aliyu, M. S. & Bambale, A. J. (2014). Due Process and Local Government Administration in Nigeria. A conceptual relationship. *Research Gate*, January. Doi:10.9790/4200-04122630
- [11]. Alkire, S. (2003). “A Conceptual Framework for Human Security”. *CRISE Working Paper*. Center for Research on Inequality, Peace and Human Security. Queen Elisabeth House, Oxford University.
- [12]. Amao, O. B. (2020). A decade of terror. Revisiting Nigeria’s interminable Boko Haram insurgency. *Security Journal*, 33(3), 357 – 375.
- [13]. Anugwom, E. E. (2009). Theories of Social Conflict. In Ikejiani Clark. *Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*. Ibadan Spectrum Books Limited.
- [14]. Awosusi, A. E. (2017). Aftermath of Boko Haram violence in the Lake Chad Basin: A neglected global health threat, *BMJ Global Health* 2017; 2:e000193,doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2016-000193.
- [15]. Boutros, B. (1992). *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping*. Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Pursuance to the Statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January, 1992.
- [16]. Cadre, H. (2017). *Current Food and Nutrition Insecurity Situation in 16 States of Nigeria*. March – May, 2017.
- [17]. Campbell, J. (2020). *Nigeria Security Tracker weekly update*. Council on Foreign Relations. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/nigeria-security-tracker-weekly-update-january-18-24#>
- [18]. Cold-Ravnkild, S. M. & Planbech, S. (2015). Boko Haram: From local grievances to the violent insurgency, <https://www.econstor.eu/bits/ream/10419/144733/1/84832970.pdf>
- [19]. Dunn, G. (2018). The Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeast Nigeria Childhood Wasting (A double – difference study. *Conflict and Health*, 12(1), 1 – 12.
- [20]. Ekhomu, O. (2020). *Boko Haram. Security Consideration and Rise of Insurgency*. CRC Press, Taylor and Francis Group, NY.
- [21]. Ender, W. & Sandler, T. (2012). *The Political Economy of Terrorism*. Cambridge University Press.
- [22]. Falk, R. A. (1990). “Revolutionaries and Functionaries: The Dual Face of Terrorism.” In *International Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Controls*, Charles, W. K. ed St Martin’s Press.
- [23]. FAO. (2016). *Result of Analysis of Current (October – December 2016 and projected June – August 2017) Situation of Acute Food and Nutrition Insecurity: Cadre Harmonise for Identifying Risk Areas and Vulnerable Population in sixteen States of Nigeria*. October 2016: pp5.
- [24]. FAO. (1996). *World Food Summit – Rome Declaration on World Food Security and WFS Plan of Action*. WFS Document. Rome, FAO.
- [25]. Fogou, V. E., Ngwafu, P., Santago, M., & Ortiz, A. (2018). The Boko Haram insurgency and its impact on border security, trade and economic collaboration between Nigeria and Cameroun: An Exploratory Study.



- African Social Sciences Review, 9(1), Article 7.
- [26]. Food Security (2006). "Policy Brief." Issued June 2, 2006. <ftp://ftp.fao.org/es/esa/policybrief/pb-02.pdf>. (access 25 January 2025).
- [27]. Garba, A. I. U. (2012). "Economic Activities have Paralyzed in Maiduguri." Blueprint, 16 March.
- [28]. Global Terrorism Index (2016). Measuring and Understanding the Impact of Terrorism, 27; Available at: <https://economicsandpeace.org/>, (accessed 16 November 2016).
- [29]. Ibabas, S. A. (2013). The root of terrorism in Nigeria: Exploring the poverty connection. *Journal of African Studies*, 6(2), 189-217.
- [30]. Ibrahim, A. & Haruna, A. (2014). Poverty alleviation programs as an alternative to peace and conflict resolution in Northern Nigeria, *Global Journal of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences* 2(2), 77-87, Corpus ID:212448533.
- [31]. Kepel, G. (2006). *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*. Harvard University Press.
- [32]. Khan, A. & Cheri, L. (2016). An examination of poverty as a foundation of crisis in Northern Nigeria. *Insight on Africa*, 2(1), 321-344.
- [33]. Kingimi, A. & Carsten, P. (2018). Militants killed about 100 soldiers in attack on Army base. Reuters.
- [34]. Maclean, R. (2018, December 28). Boko Haram Launches Series of Attacks in North-East Nigeria. *The Guardian*. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/dec/28/boko-haram-launches-series-of-attacks-in-north-east-nigeria>
- [35]. Marc-Antoine, P. M. (2014). Nigeria's Interminable Insurgency Addressing the Boko Haram Crisis, Chatham House, September 2014, www.chathamhouse.org/, accessed 28 January 2015.
- [36]. Mehari, F. (2016). The nexus between religion and terrorism: An investigation into Boko Haram killing activities in Nigeria. Uppsala University, Sweden.
- [37]. Mohammed, A. (2010). *The Paradox of Boko Haram*. Espee Printing, Kaduna.
- [38]. Mohammed, K. (2014). "The message and the Methods of Boko Haram: De Monclos (ed). *Boko Haram: Islamism, Politics, Security and the State in Nigeria*. Leiden: African Study Center.
- [39]. Musa, A. O. (2012). Socio-economic incentives, New Media and the Boko Haram Campaign of violence in Northern Nigeria. *Journal of African Media Studies*, 4(1), 111-124, doi101386/jams,4.1.111
- [40]. National Bureau of Statistics, (2012). The Nigeria Poverty Profile 2010 report – Abuja. <https://reliefweb.int/site/reliefweb.int/resources/b410c26c2021c118a6839baebc9b1428fa-98fa36a.pdf>.
- [41]. National Bureau of Statistics – NBS. (2012). Annual Abstract Statistic 2012. National Bureau of Statistics: Federal Republic of Nigeria.
- [42]. Nwolise, O. B. C. (2019). *The Imperative of Deploying Comprehensive Dose of Non-Kinetic Measures in Nigeria Counter-Insurgency Efforts in the North East*. Gold Press Ltd, Ibadan, Nigeria.
- [43]. Oladimeji, S. O. (2019). Terrorism in Nigeria: Causes, Consequence and Panacea. *IJOLS* 2019; 6(2): 341-366.
- [44]. Olaolu, O. (2012). "Imminent Food Crisis." Thisday 8 July, 2012.
- [45]. Omede, J. & Omede, A. A. (2015). Terrorism and insecurity in Nigeria: Moral values and religious education as panaceas. *Journal of Education and Practice*, 6(11).
- [46]. Omenma, J. T., Onyishi, I. E. & Okolie, A. M.N. (2020). A decade of Boko Haram activities: The attacks responses and challenges ahead. *Security Journal*, 33(3), 337 – 356.
- [47]. UNDP. (2017). Business Case Study Assessment for Accelerating Development Investment in Famine Response and Prevention, case study in Northeast Nigeria.
- [48]. UNDP (2016). *Livelihood and Economic Recovery Assessment 2016, Northeast Nigeria*.
- [49]. UNHCR (2019). Nigeria emergency. <https://www.unhcr.org/nigeria/emergency.html>.
- [50]. USAID (2011). *The Development Response to Violent Extremism and Insurgency: Putting Principles into Practice*. Available at: www.usaid.gov/pdf-docs/Pdacs4co.pdf.
- [51]. Vanguard (2012). "Women, Children killed as Boko Haram Attacked Market." 20 May.