



Islam and strategic culture of Pakistan.

Dr hab. Aleksander Głogowski, PhD, DSc

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I. Introduction.

The main purpose of the text is to present the role of Islam as a pillar of strategic culture of Pakistan. The first part is dedicated to present common scientific definition of the meaning as useful to further analyse. Second part consists the historical factor which influences Pakistan internal and foreign policy, especially at the security level. Definitely the constructive approach is most useful here, because Pakistan has been created strictly by the politicians, namely by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Indian Muslims and their political representation Pakistan Muslim League (earlier Indian Muslim League). From constructivist perspective the religion was (has been?) intentionally chosen by him and later politicians to mobilise the masses. Another argument is that M.A. Jinnah didn't have an opinion of zeal or even pious Muslim himself. Contrary his private and in some extent public image was secular and "Western" as well as was his education and profession (as a lawyer whose practise begun during his work in London's famous Lincoln's Inn). It is no room to analyse how contemporary Pakistan fits to Jinnah's vision of Pakistan as modern and...secular state (more close to Kemalists Turkey than to states like Saudi Arabia or UAE). He and his successors failed to create such a state as well as in case of creation of one, unified political nation. Contrary Pakistan is still divided alongside with national, linguistic and is some concern even tribal borders. Only religion and common thread of India are two factors unify the people who hardly can be called one, modern Pakistani Nation in political meaning.

Definitions of strategic culture.

Various authors tried to define meaning of strategic culture. Here are few examples: Roman Kuźniar: Strategic culture reaches and influences

strategy in various ways. Firstly, it provides ideas and norms for the environment of both professional strategists and politicians, who set specific goals and tasks for strategists (or play the role of strategists themselves). Secondly, the strategic culture determines the perception of the strategy's environment, i.e. domestic policy and the international situation; it is a 'spectacles' through which the world is viewed and the processes and events taking place in it are evaluated. Thirdly, it selects strategic options that appear on one's own initiative or are a response to external challenges. Fourthly, strategic culture determines the ability to mobilize national resources for the goals set by the strategy. Finally, there is no doubt that strategic culture sets the framework for public debate on national security¹.

Krzysztof Malinowski: Strategic culture refers to the sphere of beliefs shared by society and political elites relating to security policy, i.e. the place of a given state in the international system, in a narrower sense to the political aspects of the use of military force².

Kerry Longhurst: Strategic culture is the collective beliefs, ideas, values, positions and practices regarding the use of force, formed gradually through specific historical processes (subject to change as a result of the dramatic experience of a nation)³.

Jack Snyder: Strategic culture is the total sum of ideas, conditioned by emotional responses and patterns of behavior, that members of a nation's strategic community have acquired through learning or imitation and shared with each other with respect to nuclear strategy⁴.

Alastair I. Johnston: Strategic culture is an integrated system of symbols (e.g., argumentation structures, languages, analogies, metaphors) that

¹ Kuźniar, Roman. "Strategic Culture and National Security", Warsaw: Institute of Political Studies, 2010.

² Malinowski, Krzysztof. *Theories of Strategic Culture*, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 2012.

³ Longhurst, Kerry. *Strategic Culture in International Relations*, Berlin: Springer, 2004.

⁴ Snyder, Jack. *The Concept of Strategic Culture*, International Security, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1980, pp. 43-45.



seeks to establish comprehensive and long-lasting strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and effectiveness of armed forces in interstate political affairs, and to dress these concepts with such an aura of facts that strategic preferences appear uniquely realistic and effective⁵.

Colin S. Gray: strategic culture is modes of thought and action with respect to power, derived from perceptions of national historical experience, aspirations for self-characterization, and all of the many distinctly American experiences (geography, political philosophy, civic culture, and way of life) that characterize the American citizen⁶.

Yitzhak Klein: Strategic culture is the set of attitudes and beliefs held by the military establishment regarding the political goals of war and the most effective strategy and operational method to achieve them⁷.

Askar Rizvi : strategic culture as is a set of beliefs, norms, values, and historical experiences of the dominant elite that influence the understanding, interpretation and interpretation of security problems and environments and shape its responses to them⁸.

Founding myth of Pakistan – the Nation-State for the Indian Muslims.

When analysing Pakistan's contemporary strategic culture, it is important to pay attention to the notion of the founding myth of the new state. It is worth referring here to the definition of the concept of the myth of the beginning, proposed by Anna Siewierska-Chmaj: The myth of the beginning is the basis of national self-identification - it provides evidence of a respectable, because mythical, pedigree, sustains the continuity of national existence in a given area, and is a guarantee of ownership of the land⁹. The same author presents as this myth of the beginning, or rather the founding myth characteristic of newly emerging nations, the concept of M.A. Jinnah, 'Pakistan as the homeland of Indian

Muslims'¹⁰. In doing so, he quotes the state's founder's famous statement: "Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, have separate customs and literature. They do not marry each other, nor do they share a table. In fact, they belong to two different civilisations which are based on opposing and hostile ideological principles. (...) It is clear that Hindus and Muslims draw inspiration from different sources of history. They have different epics, different heroes, different episodes of their histories. Very often the hero of one is the enemy of the other and similarly the victories of the latter are the defeats of the former. Forcing two such peoples to live in one country, when the first is a majority and the second a significant minority, must lead to a state of turmoil and complete destruction of the social fabric needed by any government"¹¹. At the Lahore Conference in 1940, M. A. Jinnah clearly articulated the phrase: "Muslims are not a minority. Muslims are a nation by every known definition"¹². A. Siewierska-Chmaj writes: "The political myth of religion became a dangerous myth for Pakistan - since religion was the unifying factor for the new nation, there were demands for the state to function according to Shariah principles. How to justify the existence of a secular state when the founding myth itself uses a religious argument? How do you create a nationalist ideology so that it remains in line with the teaching of the Qur'an? What was lacking was a symbolic but secular warp capable of capturing the imagination of citizens. Proof of the non-functionality of the myth of a beginning based on religious principle alone was the declaration of independence by East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh¹³. Islam proved to be an insufficient element to maintain the unity of the young state and form the basis of Pakistani national identity. In turn, Prof. Piotr Klodkowski observes that the civilisational barriers existing in one state, according to M. A. Jinnah, must of necessity lead to an escalation of conflict and persecution of the

⁵ Johnston, Alastair I. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, p. 58.

⁶ Gray, Colin S. *Strategic Culture and Military Effectiveness*, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1992, p. 40.

⁷ Klein, Yitzhak. *The Strategic Culture of the Israeli Military*, Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 2001.

⁸ Rizvi, Askar. *The Role of Elite Beliefs in Shaping National Security*, Islamabad: South Asian Studies Institute, 2007.

⁹ Siewierska-Chmaj, Anna. National Myths and Identity, Warsaw: Polish Academy of Sciences, 2003, p. 35.

¹⁰ Siewierska-Chmaj, Anna. The Founding Myths of Newly Emerging Nations, Kraków: Jagiellonian University Press, 2007, p. 42.

¹¹ Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. Speech at the All-India Muslim League, 1940, in Collected Works of M.A. Jinnah, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 51.

¹² Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. Speech at the Lahore Conference, 1940, in Collected Works of M.A. Jinnah, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 59.

¹³ Pakistan and Bangladesh independence movement studies, Lahore: Punjab University Press, 2011, p. 77.



minority, marked by the stigma of the 'outsider'¹⁴. Thus, a state was created, the cornerstone of which became the principle that the coexistence of powerful civilisations in a common area must necessarily lead to conflict between those who profess different values. The cited authors leave out another element of Pakistan's founding myth: the suffering that accompanied the process of partition. The acts of violence that took place in the second half of 1947 lend themselves to the contemporary notion of ethnic cleansing. One can also use the term 'deportation' (the violent transfer of a population from one state to another) in the sense of the Statute of the International Military Tribunal¹⁵. Although there was no formal state of war between the new dominions, these terms reflect the actual state of affairs. This image is perpetuated in the minds of Pakistanis not only through academic publications and school textbooks, but also pop culture. The image of the slaughter of Muslims is shown, among other things, in the film production 'Jinnah' (dir. J. Dehlavi, premiered 1998, with popular British actor Christopher Lee in the title role)¹⁶. Pakistan is thus presented to the public as a kind of 'oasis of safety', protecting Indian Muslims (as a nation) from the existential threat posed by Hindu India. This trauma was exacerbated by the experience of the military defeat of 1971, when Pakistan lost half of its territory and population to the state of Bangladesh, which was created with Indian assistance¹⁷. It is characteristic of Pakistani historiography to emphasise the 'external factor' as the cause of these tragic events, and to avoid responsibility for the misguided internal policies pursued by successive governments in Karachi/Islamabad. Instead, the painful experience is used by politicians and the military as a factor to mobilise society against the external enemy - India - and to justify the huge military expenditure for the conditions of a poor country¹⁸. The appeal to the slogan of the 'Indian Muslim State' and the myth of struggle and martyrdom for freedom is also a justification for maintaining the 70-year-old conflict over Kashmir. Pakistani politicians are somewhat hostage to their own historical politics. Indeed,

educating the public and integrating it around the cause of 'defending the homeland against the Hindus' and 'fighting the Hindu occupation of Kashmir' makes any peace agreement with its neighbour, determining the future of the disputed province in any way other than its incorporation into Pakistan, unacceptable to public opinion. The question of the role of Islam in Pakistan is also noteworthy. The aforementioned Piotr Klodkowski gives the example of this country to justify the concept of a 'rupture within civilisation'¹⁹. Indeed, it illustrates perfectly the Pakistani problem from the creation of the state to the present day. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, like the creators of the concept of the 'Indian Muslim state' the poet Muhammad Iqbal or the jurist Choudhry Rahmat Ali, belonged to the secularised, colonial Indian elite. His views evolved from the idea of fighting for one India's independence to seeking a state for India's Muslims. In the state he eventually succeeded in creating, he did not want an Islamic theocracy. In the texts of speeches that have survived to this day (M. A. Jinnah did not leave behind any book in which he articulated the tenets of his political thought, and his vision of Pakistan can only be 'read' from surviving public speeches and the accounts of his associates), there is not a word that he demanded the introduction of Sharia as a state law. On the contrary, one can quote statements in which he preached secularist slogans. For example, on 7 February 1935, in the Central Legislative Assembly of India, he said: Religion should have no entry into politics. Religion is a matter between man and God. When I speak of minorities, I am speaking of a secular matter²⁰. On 11 August 1947, on the floor of the nascent Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, he said words that can even be considered his political testament: "You are free. You can go to your temples, your mosques and other places of worship in the state of Pakistan. You can belong to any faith or caste that has nothing to do with the interests of the state. If we stick to this principle, over time Hindus will cease to be Hindus, Muslims will cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense of course, because that is a matter of individual faith of the individual, but in the

¹⁴ Klodkowski, Piotr. *Civilisation and Conflict in South Asia*, Warsaw: Institute of Asian Studies, 2010, p. 92.

¹⁵ Statute of the International Military Tribunal, 1945, in *The Nuremberg Trials: A Documentary History*, New York: Harper & Row, 1960, p. 112.

¹⁶ *Jinnah* (film), Dir. J. Dehlavi, 1998.

¹⁷ *Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971*, Dhaka: Bangla Academy, 1999, p. 154.

¹⁸ *Kashmir Conflict and its impact on Pakistan-India relations*, Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Strategic Studies, 2012, p. 167.

¹⁹ Klodkowski, Piotr. *Pakistan's Internal Civilisation Divide*, Warsaw: Institute of Asian Studies, 2014, p. 179.

²⁰ Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. Speech in the Indian Legislative Assembly, 1935, in *Collected Works of M.A. Jinnah*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 186.



political sense - as citizens of the state²¹." In an interview with journalist Doon Campbell on 21 May 1947, Jinnah articulated his concept of the state: Pakistan's government is popular representation and a democratic form of government. Its parliament and government accountable to parliament will eventually be accountable to the electorate, generally to the people irrespective of creed or caste and this will be the determining factor in the government's policies and programme. Minorities will be citizens in Pakistan and will enjoy all the rights and responsibilities of citizenship irrespective of creed or caste. They will be treated fairly and equitably. The government will run the administration and will be controlled by parliament. The joint consent of parliament will guarantee that minorities will not be victims of injustice. We will introduce legal guarantees for minorities, which, in my opinion, should be written into the new constitution. There is not the slightest doubt about the fundamental rights of citizens, which are the protection of their religion and belief in all cases, especially freedom of conscience and the protection of their cultural and social life²². In one of his last public speeches before his death, in February 1948, Jinnah said: In the case of Pakistan, there will not be a theocratic state, ruled by clerics with a divine mission. We have many non-Muslims: Hindus, Christians, Parsis, but they are all Pakistanis. They have the same rights and privileges as any other citizen and will play their rightful role in Pakistani affairs²³. Slightly less secular, but still within the democratic standards of the times in which it originated, is the so-called Objectives Resolution, adopted in 1948 by the Constituent Assembly and included in every subsequent Pakistani Basic Law. Its authorship is attributed to Pakistan's first Prime Minister, Mohammed Ali Jinnah's successor, Liaquat Ali Khan : Sovereignty over the Universe belongs exclusively to Allah Almighty. The power which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through His people to exercise within the limitations prescribed by Him is a sacred inheritance. This Constituent Assembly representing the people of Pakistan is established to prepare a constitution for a sovereign and independent State of Pakistan. The state exercises its power through the elected

representatives of the people. The principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and social justice, as preached by Islam, will be fully upheld. Muslims can manage their individual and social lives according to the teachings and requirements of Islam, as laid down in the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah. Appropriate provisions are made for minorities to freely develop and practise their religions and develop their own culture. Pakistan is a federation and constitutional units are autonomous. Basic rights are guaranteed. These include equal status, equal opportunities, equality before the law, social, economic and political justice, freedom of conscience, expression of faith, worship and association, which are subject to public law and morality. Relevant laws regulate the legal safeguarding of the interests of minorities and backward and oppressed classes. The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed. The territorial integrity and federal character of the state and its independence including sovereign rights over land, sea and air territory are ensured. The people of Pakistan shall develop and take their rightful place among the peoples of the world and contribute to the development of world peace, progress and happiness of mankind²⁴. Thus, we are dealing with a declaration - a document in which there is an unequivocal reference to Allah - Allah, Islam as a religious-social system and to Islamic sources of law (Qur'an and Sunnah), and on the other hand, guarantees of respect for the rights of religious minorities to organise their lives according to their own rules. However, empirical observation shows that these provisions are interpreted in a rather arbitrary manner. What is more: the document dates from nearly 70 years ago. It was produced in a completely different social reality from that of today. According to a 2009 study conducted by the British Council, more than 75% of the respondents self-identified themselves first as Muslims (members of the Ummah) and only secondly as Pakistanis²⁵. 67% of those surveyed by a local opinion poll centre supported the process of institutional Islamisation of the state. Thus, we see that the process of making Islam an integrating factor, bridging ethnic particularisms, has succeeded in Pakistan, but with serious side effects: yes, it has

²¹ Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. Address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, 11 August 1947, in *Collected Works of M.A. Jinnah*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 193.

²² Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. Interview with Doon Campbell, 21 May 1947, in *M.A. Jinnah: Interviews and Correspondence*, Lahore: Markazi Anjuman-i-Urdu, 1985, p. 200.

²³ Jinnah, Muhammad Ali. Last public speech, February 1948, in *Collected Works of M.A. Jinnah*, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 215.

²⁴ Liaquat Ali Khan. Objectives Resolution, 1948, in *Constitutional Documents of Pakistan*, Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1980, p. 228.

²⁵ British Council. Survey on Pakistani Identity, London: British Council, 2009, p. 237.



succeeded in constructing a kind of state ideology that has overcome the existing divisions. However, it did not become 'Pakistaniness' but Islamicness. When analysing the role of Islam in Pakistan, it is important to note its internal diversity. Fundamental is the division between the main factions (sects). According to a July 2017 survey, Muslims made up 96.4% of the population, of which 85% were Sunni and 15% Shia. Another difference emerges between adherents living in rural and urban areas. In the countryside, religiosity is of a more traditional, folk character. Mullahs are members of local communities. Cuisine prohibitions are in practice limited to the consumption of pork, and due to the prevailing poverty, meat consumption in general stands at a low level. Separation between the sexes is practically non-existent, as farm work is done together. Sufi sects, based on a kind of cult of saints, are particularly popular here. The resting places of the founders of these 'orders' are popular pilgrimage sites. The situation is different in the cities. There, alongside a secularised elite, there are representatives of a radicalising middle class. This is facilitated by the compulsory teaching of Islam in schools, which aims to bring up young people in such a way that they feel more connected to the Muslim countries of the Middle East than to India, which is similar in terms of traditional culture. In such families, it is possible to practise gender segregation, as they have the material and housing conditions to do so. The vast majority of the officer corps of the Pakistani armed forces comes from lower middle class families, so the processes observed in these social groups are intertwined. A spectacular example of the changes taking place within the ranks of the Pakistani army can be seen in the introduction of a new armed forces motto in the 1970s. The previous one (identical to the motto found on the national emblem) Faith, Unity, Discipline (Urdu: ittehad, yaqeen aur tanzeem) was replaced by a new one: Faith, Piety, War in the Path of Allah (Urdu: imaan, taqwa, jihad fi sabilillah)²⁶. At the symbolic level, the figure meant to integrate Pakistan's multi-ethnic society is Mohammad Ali Jinnah, called Quaid-e-Azam (meaning 'Great Leader'). He is surrounded by a kind of cult, similar to the one we experienced in Turkey with Mustafa

Kemal Atatürk or in Poland with Marshal Józef Piłsudski²⁷. M. A. Jinnah is the patron saint of Islamabad University, Chaklala Airport near Rawalpindi, and numerous streets throughout Pakistan. Alongside him, a similar veneration is accorded to the memory of heroes killed in the wars with India, particularly the one of 1965, which is considered victorious. A special permanent exhibition has been dedicated to them at the National Museum in Lahore, a series of postage stamps have been issued to introduce them and a popular TV series, Nishan-e-Haider, has been filmed. A relatively new form of manifesting patriotism in Pakistan are the monuments commemorating the 1998 nuclear test explosions, which take the form of... a mountain in which the charges were placed. According to proponents of the constructivist theory of securitisation, security as an utterance, a speech act, is an act whose use is understood as constructing rather than reflecting reality. Hence, securitisation is "the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat of sufficient significance to have a significant political effect"²⁸. Using this paradigm, we will note that the Indian threat is treated by Pakistani politicians and military as a tool for social mobilisation, and for legitimising the desirability of a multi-ethnic Muslim state outside the Indian Union. In this sense, this contestation of India as a 'Hindustan', threatening its existence, is one of Pakistan's 'raison d'être' in its current form. In turn, through this, it is an essential element of the strategic culture: it clearly defines the enemy against which the state is to defend itself with all the means available, yet adequate to the threat. In turn, to acquire these tools, it should be ready to make even the most serious sacrifices. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto referred to these emotions in his famous statement: if India has nuclear weapons, we will eat grass, we will go hungry, but we will also have our own²⁹. Of course, an open question remains for researchers: to what extent is India's existence a real threat to Pakistan, and to what extent is it merely a projection of politicians in Islamabad, part of an internal political discourse³⁰?

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²⁶ The Pakistani Armed Forces Motto, 1970s, Islamabad: Ministry of Defence, 1978, p. 245.

²⁷ Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's influence on Pakistani leadership cult, Ankara: Turkish Studies Institute, 2006, p. 259

²⁸ Buzan, Barry, and Wæver, Ole. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998, p. 268.

²⁹ Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali. Statement on Nuclear Policy, 1970s, in Bhutto: The Pakistani Story, London: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 275.

³⁰ India-Pakistan Relations: Analysis of Political Discourse, New Delhi: South Asian Studies Centre, 2011, p. 283.



Another interesting question is to what extent the Pakistani armed forces are susceptible to Islamisation processes and to what extent they are a guarantor of the modernist character of the state. Due to the difficult access of foreign researchers to the officer cadre, not to mention the rank-and-file soldiers, it is not possible to conduct detailed empirical research on the worldview that prevails in the military. In the absence of methodologically sound research, 'cottage' methods emerge. Within the Pakistani officer corps itself, it has become accepted opinion that a sign of sympathy for fundamentalist views is... wearing a beard. If one takes this 'criterion' seriously, only four out of 50 'one-star' generals in 1999 and only one ISI intelligence chief in the entire history of the institution had such an image. Of the senior officers who participated in the 1999 coup, Mahmoud Ahmed and Mohammed Aziz Khan had a reputation as religious radicals, but only the latter wore a beard. In contrast, the leader of the coup, Gen Musharraf, was not and is not a fundamentalist, clearly indicating that a sense of 'corporate solidarity', rather than an attitude to the Qur'an and Sunnah, is more important when it comes to taking power in the state. The conditions a candidate for a Pakistani officer has to pass are an initial 'sieve' through which only those with a secondary, secular education can pass: one must have a high school diploma with a score of at least 50%. Only then are they subjected to the qualification process, including a counter-intelligence 'background check'. From official documents, and available academic publications, a picture emerges of the instrumental treatment of religion in the training and service of officers. Islam is supposed to fulfil important functions here, but which have little to do with theology: - religion is an integrating factor for the multi-ethnic society of the state artificially created in 1947. This function became even more important after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, when the prospect of a 'domino effect' traumatised the state's ruling civilian and military elites. At that time, the term 'ideological frontier' was coined, to be defended by the military with as much determination as the geographical frontier. - Islam as a morale booster for the military to fight a numerically and, for some time, technologically stronger opponent - India. The concept of jihad is very useful here. As Pakistani security analyst P. I. Cheema writes: "Participation in jihad is a great honour in two senses: death is then martyrdom, while victory makes the warrior a

hero"³¹. The same author points out that in the face of Indian superiority, Pakistani officers and soldiers must focus on gaining moral superiority, manifested in a higher degree of professionalism, study of the latest strategic and tactical concepts and ideologically inspired leadership³²." It is difficult to speak of any religious fundamentalism here, as similar references can also be found in the history of European armies: the German army's motto "Gott mit Uns" was already written on soldiers' belt buckles in imperial times, and Polish banners and sabres bear the motto: "God, Honour, Homeland". When we look at the perception of the term shahid (or martyr) that has taken hold in Pakistan, there are two tendencies here. One traditionally refers to Muslims who have died/fell in defence of the faith (and only Allah Himself can recognise a person as a shahid). On the other hand, in official documents, as well as in state propaganda, the term 'shahid' is used to refer to anyone who has given his or her life in defence of the (Islamic) homeland - Pakistan. Moreover: in this sense, not only Muslims but also representatives of other religions who have fallen in the service of Pakistan can be (and are) considered Shahids. Such a symbol of 'martyrdom for the fatherland' is the Nishan-e-Haider, the highest state decoration, which is awarded only posthumously. It is customary for anyone who receives it to later be titled a shahid in the scriptures. It is also customary to refer to all those who have fallen in battle against India as such, including Christians. We can therefore speak here not so much of the Koranic meaning of the word 'shahid', but rather of a thoroughly European tradition. After all, Horace already wrote in Song III: Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori (it is sweet and honourable to die for one's homeland). - The concept of 'Islamic solidarity' has been and is being used as a justification for waging (to use a contemporary term) an asymmetrical conflict both in Afghanistan (officially between 1979 and 1991, but one gets the impression that certain circles, especially in the Pakistani intelligence service, are still trying to do so today) and in the Indian-controlled part of the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. In the first case, the issue is not in much doubt. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was perceived by Pakistan as a serious threat. It was feared, it would become the next target for communist expansion (similar to that in Indochina, for example). Using a heuristic perspective, one can allude here to Russia's traditional interest in accessing ports located on the

³¹ Cheema, P. I. Pakistan's Military: An Enigma in the Modern World, Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2008, p. 215.

³² Ibidem Cheema, P. I. p. 218.



warm (non-freezing) open waters of the Arabian Sea. Obviously, Pakistan's direct involvement with the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was impossible if only because of the colossal difference in military potentials. The choice was therefore to engage indirectly, by supporting local fighters, called mujahideen. This term traditionally refers to participants in the holy war - the jihad. Gradually, the United States also became involved in their training and equipping (seeing the possibility of turning Afghanistan into a "thousand Vietnams" - a war involving and depleting the resources of a rival superpower) and the 'oil' states of the Gulf, in particular Saudi Arabia (which was thus 'getting rid' of domestic radicals who, instead of participating in the internal politics of the monarchy, had taken to actively participating in the war against the Soviet Union, while at the same time creating itself as the leader of the Islamic world, or at least of its greater Sunni part). In the case of the Indian part of Kashmir, the matter is far more complicated. From the very beginning of the conflict in 1947, and definitely since the 1965 war, Pakistan has been trying to demonstrate that its involvement is not of an aggressive nature towards India, but is only in support of its Muslim brethren, persecuted by the authorities in Srinagar and New Delhi. To Western analysts of international relations, this is a no-brainer, but this propaganda appeals both to Pakistani public opinion and to its many sponsors in the 'oil' Gulf states. In both cases described, however, there is a serious danger: the circles funding the Afghan or Kashmir jihad are very radical and care about the ideological purity of the organisations they fund (and in the first case: in whose activities volunteers from them have actively participated). In this way, the Pakistani-Afghan border region in particular has become an area of activity for groups and individual Salafist preachers. This led to a very dangerous synthesis of the native (in terms of direct political influence, marginal but nevertheless consciousness-forming part of the Pakistani elite) deobandian fundamentalism of which Abu Ala al Maududi was the symbol with Wahhabism (now known as Salafism), which originated in Saudi Arabia. Maududi himself was more of an ideologue, politician or religious leader and the Jamat-e-Islami association he founded focused on organic work rather than active violence. However, with his teachings, he prepared the ground for the activities of the more radical circles that are generally referred to as the Taliban. In the context of the conflict over Kashmir, this ideology is being used not as a concept to help mobilise young Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian government and security forces. It is also intended to help win the 'government of souls'

especially in the face of a growing independence movement in Kashmir (and the European Kashmiri diaspora), represented by the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front. The use of the slogan of jihad as a justification for engagement in Afghanistan and Kashmir overlapped in time with the rule of military president Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. One of the main slogans of his policies and tools for legitimising his authoritarian rule was Islamisation. This process will be described more extensively in the third volume of the publication. Here, however, it is important to focus on what impact this programme had on the armed forces themselves, of which General Zia was also the supreme commander. Some authors point to the general's close contacts with the Jamaat-e-Islami and even the presence of some family links with its leaders. He had a reputation as a devout Muslim, attaching great importance to religious practices, something that could not be said of previous military officers at the head of Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s. He repeatedly expressed the opinion that Pakistan's army officers should be characterised by religious observance. During the inauguration of the 1978 academic year at the Kakul military academy, he said that "officers should uphold both ideological and geographical boundaries" (the order of these terms is important here). While still Chief of Army Staff, he 'turned a blind eye' to the activities of Islamic agitators from the JI, and the Tablighi Jamaat among the waxworks. Later, already as head of state, he attended meetings of these associations, which none of his predecessors had done. He also ordered the introduction of Islamic studies in the training curriculum of the Command and Staff College in Quetta. He also introduced the institution of Muslim chaplains. Mullahs were henceforth to participate in the daily service of soldiers, and to be present with them on the battlefield. Most of these people did not have a proper general education, and religious education is also considered to be quite superficial. The attitude towards religion also began to be taken into account in the career development of officers. Until then, it had not mattered to the extent that the consumption of alcohol in officers' casinos was not only tolerated, but was even considered customary. The ideologisation of the military was also facilitated by the involvement of Pakistani military personnel as officers and contract soldiers in the Gulf states. Gen Zia himself was the commander of such a contingent in the Kingdom of Jordan, where he took part in pacifying the uprising in the Palestinian camps, known as 'Black September'. This type of activity was justified not so much economically (as an opportunity to earn money) or for training reasons (gaining skills in combat), but primarily as an expression of Islamic



solidarity. It is difficult to assess unequivocally (due to the lack of such data, or even the possibility of collecting it) whether officers subjected to such pressure when speaking to soldiers actually said what they thought, or whether they were driven by pure opportunism aimed at individual careers. Research conducted by Georgetown University's American political scientist Prof Christine Fair seeks to show the impact (or rather the lack thereof) of Islamisation policies on the ideological profile of officers in the Pakistani armed forces. Her team accessed data on the backgrounds of the graduates of the Kakul academy. They clearly show that most of the young officers come from among the urban elite, especially graduates of public schools. They are therefore representatives of liberal backgrounds. Conversely, young people from conservative Pakistani backgrounds are less interested in a military career. Still, Punjabis and Pashtuns make up a larger percentage of the officer cadre than in Pakistani society as a whole. However, the same author points out that a certain symptom of the radicalisation of the cadres of the Pakistani armed forces is the few but nevertheless visible participation of their representatives in terrorist attacks carried out on the territory of the state. This refers to an isolated but spectacular incident on 6 August 2014, when several Pakistan Navy officers attempted to hijack the PNS ship Zulfikar to use it to attack a US supply ship. Five perpetrators were arrested and confessed to links with the so-called Islamic State. The other five were killed while attempting to subdue the vessel. To date, this is the only terrorist act recorded by the media involving active duty military personnel, which does not warrant sweeping generalisations and hypotheses. In contrast, another serious problem is pointed out by Jason Roach in an article for Small Wars Journal. Pakistan's armed forces have, for the first time in their 70-year history, been directed to fight their own people. This has to do with Pakistan's participation in the 'Global War on Terror' and, in particular, its operations against the so-called 'Pakistani Taliban' in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (particularly Waziristan). Data on the ethnic composition of the military subdivisions fighting there is not available. While it is difficult to imagine using Pashtuns, for whom ethnic and especially clan ties are crucial, engaging Muslims to fight other Muslims also seems potentially dangerous. While it was successful in the case of fighting the independence fighters from East Bengal (the future Bangladesh), who were alien to the people of West Pakistan and made up a small percentage in the armed forces, the issue of fighting familiar peoples, whose representatives are numerous in the armed forces, poses a serious threat both to the

morale of the army and harms the process of state integration, which has hitherto been one of the key tasks of the Pakistani army. Past wars with India have done an excellent job of this, uniting different ethnic groups to fight a common, religiously alien enemy.

II. Conclusion

Religion still plays significant role as unifying factor of internally divided society of Pakistan. Analysing contemporary events accompanying the Global War on Terror and change of power in neighbouring Afghanistan, as well as internal political crisis of power we can see Islam is no more constructive, unifying factor. It become a threat of modern secular structure of the state of Pakistan and "democracy in permanent statu nascendi". It is hard to predict how long present secular state and it's secular national army will survive the struggle against militant Islamic organisations and national separatisms (usually supported from abroad). It is question if Pakistan will remain moderate Muslim state or it will change into extremist Emirate (like Talibanized Afghanistan) armed with nuclear weapons. Third option is total collapse of Pakistan and dismemberment alongside the ethnic borders.

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